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This paper utilizes a unique dataset on votes cast by Czech and Polish migrants in recent national elections 
in their home countries. The political preferences of migrants as manifested by their voting behavior are 
strikingly different from those of their home-country counterparts. In addition, there are important 
differences in voting patterns across migrants living in different countries. We examine three explanations 
of migrant voting behavior: adaptive learning; economic self-selection; and political self-selection. Our 
results suggest that migrant voting behavior is affected by the institutional environment of the host 
countries, in particular the democratic tradition and the extent of economic freedom. There is little evidence 
that differences in migrants’ political attitudes are caused by pre-migration self-selection with regard to 
political attitudes, or with regard to economic considerations. The results indicate that the political 
preferences of migrants change significantly in the wake of migration as migrants adapt to the norms and 
values prevailing in the host country. This change away from home could be the catalyst of a corresponding 
change at home. 
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1. Introduction 
The social and political assimilation of migrants is of considerable interest to political 
scientists and economists alike. Poor assimilation may engender a segmented and 
possibly polarized society, with migrant communities espousing political, cultural and 
religious values that may be very different from those prevailing in the host country.
1 
Political assimilation may also have an important impact on the migrants’ country of 
origin, especially for countries with large diasporas communities. For example, migrant 
communities of Moslems in Europe, which largely succeeded in retaining their religious 
norms and political attitudes, are sometimes seen as providing refuge and breeding 
grounds for Moslem extremism. This, in turn, undermines the stability of both the host 
countries and their ancestral countries.
2 On the other hand, returning immigrants from 
Western democracies to Central and Eastern Europe played a crucial role in facilitating 
the post-communist countries’ transition from communism to democracy and overcoming 
the Soviet legacy, especially in the spheres of politics, the economy, education, and 
cultural life.
3 The political attitudes which migrants espouse can thus have important 
bearings on political developments in the ancestral countries.  
The existing literature has identified a number of channels through which the 
experience of migrating and living in a foreign country affects migrants’ economic and 
                                                 
1 Huntington (2004) presents a particularly gloomy and controversial assessment of the dangers posed 
by the growing Hispanic community in the US and their lack of assimilation.  
2 This is especially the case in moderately democratic and/or secular countries such as Turkey, 
Morocco or Algeria.  
3 This was particularly pronounced in, though not limited to, the Baltic countries: the current 
presidents of Latvia and Lithuania, Vaira Vike-Freiberga and Valdas Adamkus, respectively, are both 
former political refugees who spent most of their adult lives in emigration and only returned after the Baltic 
countries seceded from the Soviet Union. Émigré advisors played an important role in the design and 
execution of Czechoslovak and Polish reform programs: Jan Svejnar (United States) for the former and 
Stanislaw Wellisz (United States), Stanislaw Gomulka and Jacek Rostowski (both from the United 
Kingdom) for the latter. A naturalized US citizen, Muhamed Sacirbey, was instrumental in building support 
for Bosnia’s independence during his term as Bosnia’s ambassador to the UN in early 1990s. In 2000, the 
then Czech president Václav Havel designated Madeleine Albright (who was born in Czechoslovakia as 
Marie Korbelová) as his preferred successor (though the invitation was eventually declined). A somewhat 
unconventional example of a returning émigré is the current prime minister of Bulgaria – the former king 
Simeon II. In a celebrated example, the economic reforms in Chile under Pinochet were conceived and 
carried out by the “Chicago Boys”: a group of Chicago-educated economists. Argentinean reform effort of 
early 1990s, similarly, was lead by US-educated economists: Domingo Cavallo (Harvard) and Roque 
Fernandez (Chicago). Finally, the diaspora played an important role in the recreation and defense of Israeli 
statehood: a notable example is that of Golda Meir, prime minister during the 1967 war, who was a 
naturalized American citizen.    3
social outcomes. Firstly, migrants build up their human capital stock by acquiring new 
languages and productive skills, participating in formal education in the host country, and 
becoming acquainted with new social and cultural norms.
4 Secondly, migrants typically 
accumulate savings, thus building up their stock of physical capital, which can then be 
used to aid self-employment in the destination country or to set up businesses, either by 
themselves or through relatives left behind in the country of origin.
5 Finally, migrants 
also acquire social capital through contacts with the host population, in addition to 
becoming part of a migrant network in the destination country.
6 
This paper considers another potentially important implication of migration that has 
to date been largely unexplored: the impact of migration on the migrants’ political 
opinions and, especially, their voting behavior.
7 Migration often entails moving to a 
different political system with diverse political standards, norms and traditions, and to a 
different economic system. Through exposure to local news, culture, formal schooling or 
through contacts with co-workers, neighbors and friends, migrants are confronted with 
fundamental norms and values that may be different from, or are even in outright conflict 
with, those prevailing in their home countries. Important examples of such differences 
include attitudes towards democracy and a market-oriented economic system and 
religious tolerance and secularism. This paper studies whether such exposure induces 
migrants to adopt the norms and values prevailing in their destination country. To this 
end, we utilize an original data set which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been 
previously used in studies of voting or migration: votes cast by citizens living abroad who 
participate in their home country’s elections.  
In addition to introducing the political dimension into the study of migration and its 
implications, this paper also sheds new light on the fundamental question in the voting 
literature: how do voters formulate their political opinions and attitudes? The political 
socialization literature disagrees as to whether one’s political preferences are largely 
                                                 
4 Friedberg (2000), Chiswick and Miller (2004) and Hartog and Winkelmann (2004) analyze 
migrants’ labor-market return to skills brought from the home country and adopted in the host country.  
5 See Stark (1991) Chapters 26-28, and Lofstrom (2004).  
6 Rauch and Trindade (2002) find that ethnic Chinese networks increase bilateral trade flows among 
South-east Asian countries by as much as 60%. 
7 While the academic literature failed to explore this topic so far, a recent novel by the Czech émigré 
writer Milan Kundera depicts some of the political and cultural conflicts encountered by returning 
emigrants; see Kundera (2002).    4
determined in young age by family environment and upbringing, or whether they are 
continuously shaped and updated by changes in one’s socio-economic characteristics 
and/or the social, political and institutional environment. Typically, empirical analyses of 
voting behavior, particularly in established democracies, take the external environment as 
given and stable over time. Even in countries undergoing radical political and economic 
transformations (such as the Central and East European countries), all voters are exposed 
to essentially the same process of change. It is therefore difficult to determine the extent 
to which one’s external environment, and changes therein, influence voting decisions. 
This characterization, however, does not apply to migrants who are often subject to 
dramatic changes in their external environment. Furthermore, migrants living in different 
countries become exposed to different economic, political and social norms and values. 
The data used in this paper, therefore, are akin to a natural experiment, whereby we 
observe votes cast by migrants from the same country of origin who, at the time of the 
election in their home country, live in different foreign countries. By relating the 
migrants’ voting behavior to the economic, political and institutional characteristics of 
the destination countries, we can make inferences about the nature of interactions 
between these characteristics and voters’ political preferences.  
The analysis is based on the most recent parliamentary elections in the Czech 
Republic (2002) and Poland (2001). These countries are particularly suited for such an 
analysis as they currently undergo transition from communism to democracy and from 
central planning to a market economy, which involves significant political, economic and 
institutional changes. Therefore, Czechs and Poles are already likely to be amenable to 
change, and the changes that they experience in the wake of migration are often 
substantial (certainly more so than the changes experienced by a migrant from a 
developed country moving to another developed country).  
While the numbers of migrant voters are by no means small, their direct impact on 
political developments in their home countries is modest at best. The 3,742 Czechs and 
26,211 Poles who voted abroad (in 85 and 90 countries, respectively) accounted for only 
0.08% and 0.20% of the total number of votes in their respective countries. Yet, the most 
striking characteristics of the votes from abroad are that they differ dramatically from the 
votes cast at home, and, in addition, that they vary substantially across the host countries   5
and regions. In both countries, the national elections resulted in victories for left-wing 
parties, whereas the Czechs and Poles living abroad overwhelmingly voted for right-wing 
(and in the case of Poland also religious conservative) parties. The difference is driven 
mainly by votes cast by migrants in Western Europe, North America and Australia. In 
contrast, the voting preferences of Czech and Polish migrants in the former communist 
countries, the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and, to a lesser extent Asia, 
do not differ overtly from those of the home-country electorates.  
This paper considers three possible explanations for these differences. First, migrants 
may be subject to a selection bias (either due to self-selection or because of the 
destination countries’ immigration policies) whereby the determinants of which country 
they emigrate to are correlated with the migrants’ economic characteristics. Second, the 
choice of the destination country may similarly reflect the migrants’ political preferences. 
Finally, migrants’ political attitudes and preferences may be shaped by the institutional, 
political and economic environment and by the cultural norms prevailing in the host 
country. To assess the relative importance of these explanations, the shares of votes cast 
by migrant voters for each home political party are related to variables reflecting the host 
countries’ level of economic development, recent economic performance, political 
institutions (such as the level of political and economic freedom and the nature of the 
political system in place) and social characteristics.  
A fourth possible determinant of migrant voting behavior are the policies proposed by 
the various parties that directly affect migrants, such as citizenship issues, protection of 
their rights to property left behind in the home country, social security, or the treatment 
of their families. However, inasmuch as there is no discrimination based on migrants’ 
host countries, this factor can help explain the difference between voting preferences of 
migrants and voters in the home countries, but not the variation across host countries.
8  
The following section compares the voting behavior of Czechs and Poles who voted 
in their home countries and those who voted from abroad, and describes the data used in 
the analysis. Section 3 outlines the main theoretical explanations of voting behavior, and 
                                                 
8 The main exception to this is the parties’ stance on accession to the EU, as this may have a different 
effect on migrants living in the EU or other acceding countries, than on those living in countries that will 
remain outside the EU.    6
relates them to theories of migration. Section 4 describes the methodology, and Section 5 
presents the results of analysis. A summary of the main findings is offered in Section 6.  
 
2. Migrants’ Voting Behavior  
The legal framework regulating voting by nationals living abroad is similar in both 
the Czech Republic and Poland. Both countries require advance registration and allow 
voting only in person; hence, voting by postal ballot or by proxy is not possible. Those 
who permanently live abroad must register with the embassy or consulate in the country 
of their permanent residence. Those with permanent residence in the home country, on 
the other hand, can vote when abroad upon presenting a voter’s card issued by the 
municipal council in their district of permanent residence.
9 The Czech Republic only 
allows voting at embassies and consulates. Poland, in contrast, also established a number 
of polling stations in Polish clubs and émigré associations in countries with large migrant 
populations (for instance, there were eight polling stations in Chicago and four in New 
York City) and also within a few large overseas installations of Polish firms (including, 
for example, the Polish permanent research station in Antarctica).  
Poland was generally more successful than the Czech Republic in persuading its 
citizens abroad to vote, with voters’ abroad accounting for 0.20% of the electorate in 
Poland and 0.08% in the Czech Republic. While this may simply reflect the fact that 
Poles are more inclined to leave their country
10, it is undoubtedly also due to the greater 
density of Polish polling stations (both because Poland, as a larger country, tends to have 
multiple consulates in larger countries and because voting was also possible at additional 
polling stations outside of embassies or consulates). In addition, Poland adopts a more 
liberal attitude to dual nationality than the Czech Republic, such that Poles who live 
permanently abroad and have acquired the host country’s nationality are often able to 
remain Polish citizens.  
                                                 
9 We have no information on the number of votes cast by permanent residents in the host countries 
and short-term visitors; hence we cannot distinguish between migrants and tourists. 
10 It is estimated that there are between 14 and 17 million Poles living outside Poland, with the largest 
Polonia (i.e. Polish emigrants) located in the United States, where approximately 9 million Poles reside (see 
www.wikipedia.org).   7
Overall, 3,742 Czechs and 26,211 Poles cast their votes in 85 and 90 different 
countries, respectively. Tables 1 and 2 report the main election results for both countries. 
The country with the largest number of Czech voters is Slovakia with 374 votes (not 
surprisingly given the common history) followed by the US (285), France (260), Italy 
(200) and Germany (196). The country with the largest number of Polish votes is the US 
with 7,061 votes, followed by Germany (2,872), Canada (1,641) and France (1,406). 
Quite surprisingly, relatively few votes were received from other former socialist 
countries. Russia, for example, only accounts for 96 Czech and 606 Polish votes, while 
410 Polish votes were received from the Czech Republic and 70 from Czechs who voted 
in Poland.  
The number of Czech and Polish migrants who participated in their home countries’ 
national elections is by no means large. The OECD SOPEMI report gives information on 
the stock of migrants from the main origin countries living in the various member 
countries of OECD. While the numbers of Czech migrants are typically too small to 
warrant a separate entry, the information on the number of Polish migrants is available 
for several countries. Comparing these numbers with the number of migrant voters, the 
fraction of migrants who voted ranges from 0.9% in Germany to 9% in Belgium and 13% 
in Hungary. Clearly, there is a trade-off between the size of the country and migrants’ 
electoral participation: many Polish migrants in Germany live far from the nearest 
embassy or consulate and the cost of voting is therefore too high (besides the embassy in 
Berlin, Poland has also consulates in Cologne, Hamburg, Leipzig, Munich and Stuttgart), 
unlike the typical Polish migrant in Hungary or Belgium.
11  
The number of migrants participating in the 2001 Polish national election appears low 
also when compared with other elections for which data from voting abroad are available: 
the 2000 presidential election which saw the participation of over 57 thousand Polish 
migrants, 0.32% of the total number of votes, and the 2003 referendum on Polish 
accession to the EU, with nearly 80 thousand valid votes cast abroad, accounting for 
0.45% of all votes (the 2002 Czech election was the first, and so far the only, election that 
                                                 
11 Specifically, the available figures on voter participation among migrants (and the corresponding 
numbers of polling stations in the country) are the following: Germany 0.9% (6 polling stations), Czech 
Republic 2.4% (4 polling stations), Italy 2.9% (3 polling stations), Denmark 3.1% (1 polling station), 
Sweden 3.8% (3 polling stations), Belgium 9.1% (1 polling station), and Hungary 12.7% (1 polling station).    8
allowed voting at embassies and consulates abroad; in contrast to Poland, the Czech 
electoral law does not allow voting abroad in referenda).  
The present-day Czech and Polish emigrant communities are the product of multiple 
emigration waves. Poland participated in the migration flow from Europe that took place 
throughout the 19
th century (often referred to as The Great Emigration of 1831-1870), 
primarily to the New World countries. These migrants were mainly unskilled and 
uneducated economic emigrants, however a large number of them were also political 
emigrants who participated in the many revolutions which took place in Poland 
throughout the century. This migration wave laid the foundations for the large Polish 
diaspora communities in the United States (particularly in the Chicago area), France and 
elsewhere. The Czech Republic also participated in this migration but the flow was much 
smaller
12 and the reasons for emigrating were largely economic. Another large migration 
wave came with the German occupation of the two countries in the course of the Second 
World War. Nevertheless, many of these migrants returned home after the War. The 
communist takeover in 1947-48 lead to another major outflow of political refugees, 
which, although diminished, continued throughout the communist period. The last major 
wave of Czech migration came with the Soviet occupation in 1968 and the subsequent 
repression
13. Poland experienced a similar outflow of political refugees during the early 
1980s in the wake of the crushing of the Solidarity movement and the proclamation of the 
state of emergency. During the 1990s, the worsening economic conditions in Poland 
precipitated an increase in migration prompted primarily by economic motives. Finally, 
after the end of the communist regime, the lifting of travel restrictions allowed further 
economic migration from both countries.  
The motives for migration thus changed considerably over time. Migrants from the 
earlier emigration waves are less likely to appear in our data, as many have died or 
relinquished the nationality of the home country. This is particularly likely for the Czech 
Republic which does not permit dual nationality; Poland, on the other hand, is more 
liberal on this front. The majority of the Czech voters from abroad are likely to be 
                                                 
12 The 1870 US census, stated 40, 289 Czech emigrants were in the United States, however its 
believed that the number was far greater as many declared Austria to be their home country (Miller, 1978). 
13 Approximately 150,000 Czechs and Slovaks fled to the West after Prague Spring (see 
http://archiv.radio.cz/history/history14.html)   9
migrants who left their country in the late part of the communist period and after the 
demise of communism. The Polish data set, in contrast, may also include some of the 
earlier migrants or their descendants. Due to larger size and often regional concentration, 
especially in parts of the US, the Polish migrant community comes closer to constituting 
a true diaspora, with its own media, shops, cultural and social establishments, and 
political life. The Czech migrants, in contrast, tend to be more dispersed, and as such are 
likely to integrate into the host communities more fully. This issue is further discussed in 
Section 5.  
Table 1 shows the percentages of votes received by the five main political parties in 
the Czech Republic from both home voters and from voters living abroad. The most 
striking difference between the two sets of results is in the support for the Communist 
Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), which received 18.55% of the vote in the Czech 
Republic but only 2.75% from Czech citizens living abroad. There is, however, 
considerable variation across the migrants’ host countries. The communists fared 
relatively well in votes cast by migrants in the countries of the former Soviet Union, 
where they polled 7.37%, closely followed by 6.90% in Central and East European 
countries and 3.17% in the Middle East and North Africa. In contrast, the communist 
party did poorly in Asia and North America, receiving only 0.53% and 0.54% of the vote, 
respectively. Another party for which support among migrant voters significantly 
deviates from its support at home is the Coalition (which was formed in 2000 as a pre-
election coalition of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party 
(KDU-CSL), Democratic Union (DEU), and Freedom Union (US).
14 While the Coalition 
party only garnered 14.28% of the overall vote in the Czech Republic, it received an 
impressive 33.99% of the migrant votes. Support for the Coalition party reaches a high of 
54.24% in Australia and a low of 17.51% in the FSU countries. The Coalition did well 
also among voters living in Western Europe (42.07%)and Northern America (47.17%). 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.  
 
                                                 
14 Originally, the Quad Coalition also included the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA). The ODA later 
left this grouping, and eventually withdrew from the election altogether.    10
Overall, the results display a considerable disagreement between the Czech electorate 
at large and Czech voters living abroad. If Czechs abroad had their say, the elected 
government would most probably be a coalition of right-wing parties rather than a 
government lead by the Social Democrats with the Coalition as their junior partner. 
However, there is also considerable disagreement among migrant voters living in 
different countries. Czech citizens living in the former communist countries tend to favor 
left-wing parties, with support for the KSCM being highest in the former Soviet Union 
and support for the center-left CSSD being highest in Central and East European 
countries. In contrast, Czechs living in Western democracies tend to support more center-
right parties such as the ODS and the Coalition party. Those residing in Asian and 
African countries also display higher levels of support for the ODS, while those in 
Central and South American countries and North African and Middle Eastern countries 
tend to support the CSSD.  
Table 2 similarly shows the percentage of votes received by the eight main Polish 
political parties from citizens living abroad and the overall election results of the 2001 
election to the Sejm (the lower chamber of the Parliament). The election brought about a 
dramatic change in the political make-up of the new parliament, with the two incumbent 
parties (AWSP and UW) even failing to pass the threshold (5% for parties and 8% for 
coalitions) required for representation in the parliament. The preferences of Poles living 
abroad differ notably from the sentiments of their domestic counterparts, although 
perhaps not as dramatically as in the Czech case. The main divergences occurs, on the 
one hand, with respect to the winner of the election, the Democratic Left Alliance-Labor 
Union (SLD-UP) and, on the other hand, in regard to the various fringe parties.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.  
 
The 2001 Polish election resulted in a coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance-
Labor Union (SLD-UP) and the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL, although subsequently the 
PSL withdrew from that coalition, leaving the SLD-UP with a slim parliamentary   11
majority). The SLD-UP
15 received 41.04% of the overall vote but only 25.98% of the 
migrant votes. Had the migrant votes been the deciding factor, this coalition would not 
have been viable and a right-of-center government of the Citizens’ Platform (PO), Law 
and Justice Party (PiS) and the Freedom Union (UW), would have been more likely.
16 
These three parties received, respectively, 12.68%, 9.50% and 3.10% of the overall vote, 
compared with 15.88%, 19.04% and 10.02% of the migrant votes. The preferences of 
migrant voters also deviated considerably in the case of two new radical parties. The Self 
Defence of the Polish Republic (SO), a radical farmers’ movement, fared poorly among 
Poles living abroad (1.37%) compared to its domestic support (10.2%). The League of 
Polish Families (LPR), a nationalist-Christian based far-right party, received 7.87% of the 
overall domestic vote but garnered an impressive 17.84% of the vote from Polish 
migrants. The support for SLD-UP was highest among Poles living in North Africa and 
the Middle-East (48.93%), closely followed by the Former Soviet Union (44.55%), 
Central and Eastern Europe (44.49%) and Asia (43.56%). In contrast, they derived least 
support in North America (13.97%).  
 
3. Theories of Voting, Political Socialization, and Migration 
The economic theory of voting builds on the seminal contribution of Downs (1957) 
who applied rational choice theory to voting behavior. Downs posited that individuals 
vote in order to maximize their expected utility, given the information available to them 
at the time of the election. A number of factors can enter the voters’ utility function (and 
these factors may enter with different weights across voters and/or across time). 
Nannestad and Paldam (1994) differentiate between the economic and political 
components of the voters’ utility function. The economic component stands for indicators 
of voters’ material well being associated with voting for a particular party (the literature 
further distinguishes between egocentric and sociotropic voters, the former are primarily 
concerned with their own individual well being while the latter put greater weight on 
                                                 
15 The SLD which has its roots in the original Polish Communist Party but, unlike the Czech KSCM, 
it has shed its communist heritage and transformed into modern socialist party.  
16 These three parties in fact jointly fielded candidates in the election to the Senate, the upper chamber 
of the Polish Parliament.   12
aggregate economic outcomes). Rational voters will support parties expected to 
implement policies that are favorable to the voters and will increase their welfare. The 
political component corresponds to the utility which the voters derive from ideology, 
religion, patriotism and nationalism, racial and ethnic or linguistic identification. 
Naturally, all else being equal, a voter will support a party that stands for values similar 
to his own. Finally, voters can also behave strategically, such that voting for a specific 
party will have greater bearing on the voter’s utility if that party eventually participates in 
the government or is included in the legislature. Therefore, voters may shy away from 
voting for fringe parties and may instead support their second-best choice, which is more 
likely to receive enough votes from other voters. Alternatively, voters can use their votes 
to send a signal to the future government, as argued by Piketty (2000) and Castanheira 
(2003). Accordingly, by voting for extremist parties, the voters may induce the 
mainstream parties to shift their post-election policies closer to those of the extremists.  
In a stylized way, the utility that voter i receives if party j is elected and implements 
its policies can be expressed as follows:  
() () i j i i ij i ij x x C U ε λ λ + − − − =
2 1  
In this expression, the first term, Cij, represents the economic component of the 
voter’s utility function while the second term, (xi-xj)
2, is the political component.  λi, 
which takes values between zero and one, determines the relative weights of the two 
terms; although  λi may vary over time, time subscripts have been omitted for simplicity. 
The economic component primarily measures the future consumption opportunities (with 
consumption defined broadly) that result from party j’s actions while in government or in 
the legislature. The political term measures the distance between the voter’s ideological 
position, xi, and that of the party in question, xj, with the voter’s utility falling as the 
distance increases. The last term, εi, collects all the remaining aspects of the voting 
decision, such as random swings in political attitudes but also potential strategic 
considerations.  
To migrant voters who live outside the jurisdiction of their national government, the 
first term, representing economic considerations, is likely to bear a little on their voting 
behavior, concern for friends and family back home or the expection of return to their   13
home country notwithstanding. Therefore, we assume λi=0, and focus on the second 
term, namely, voters’ political and ideological opinions.  
While political systems and institutions in most countries are generally very slow to 
change, the changes experienced by migrants as voters are often dramatic. Moreover, 
migrants moving to different countries are exposed to different institutions and political 
systems. Therefore, by relating migrants’ votes to political and institutional variables in 
the destination countries, we can learn how the external environment conditions political 
attitudes and voting behavior.
17 
While several studies have analyzed the voting behavior of migrant communities in 
the national elections of their new country of residence
18, to the best of our knowledge, 
none to date have examined the impact of the new political, social and cultural 
environment on the voting behavior of migrants participating in elections in their country 
of origin. As already stated, empirical analyses of voting take the external environment as 
given and stable over time. Therefore, by analyzing the voting behavior of migrant 
populations in a large number of diverse countries, we can infer to what extent the 
external environment matters in the formation or transformation of a migrant’s core 
political values, beliefs and subsequent behavior, a process referred to in the literature as 
political resocialization.  
While the literature on the formation of political attitudes is vast, the two main 
conflicting theories are the Social Psychological model and the Rational Choice model. 
The social psychological theorists (Campbell et al., 1960) tend to emphasize the 
importance of parental socialization and downplay the role of short-term influences, 
while the rational choice theorists (Downs, 1957) stress the continuous incorporation of 
new information into the cumulative evaluations of various parties. Political 
resocialization can be defined more in terms of the rational choice hypothesis, whereby 
the migrants incorporate information about the new political environment into their 
                                                 
17 As discussed above, migrant voters’ decisions may be affected also by economic considerations 
because of altruistic concerns or because they expect to return in the future. In that case, however, their 
voting behavior is likely to be shaped by economic developments back home rather than those in the 
country where they currently live. Yet, we might find a significant effect if, for instance, migrants in high-
inflation countries perceive anti-inflationary policies as important also for their home country, and 
accordingly vote for parties that they expect to be tough on inflation.  
18 Black et al. (1987); Cho (1999); Correa (1998); Finifter and Finifter (1989); Garcia (1987); 
Gitelman (1982); Glaser and Gilens (1997); Wong (2000).    14
decision sets. Examining voting behavior among those who move across states in the US, 
Brown (1988) found that if the new political environment differs from the old political 
environment, then both voting behavior and party identification tend to become similar to 
those in the new state. However, research by Black et al. (1987), which examined the 
political adaptation of immigrants to Canada, found that the country of origin did not 
exert a strong influence on post-migration political adaptation. Finifter and Finifter 
(1989) find that both past party identification and political ideology influence the political 
adaptation of American emigrants in Australia. Finally, drawing on pre-election poll data 
for both native Israelis and immigrants from the former communist countries who live in 
Israel, Nannestad, Paldam and Rosholm (2003) examine the speed at which migrants’ 
opinions converge to those of native voters in the evaluations of the economic 
competence of the government. They find very little difference between the two groups, 
hence suggesting that migrants quickly adopt the economic evaluation patterns of the 
natives. However, all these studies are based on migrants’ attitudes towards the political 
system in the destination country or region. In particular, this focus implies that the 
analysis is concerned with migrants who have integrated into the host society sufficiently 
to have become naturalized citizens. In contrast, our study considers migrants, who are 
still nationals of their country of origin, and indeed may have no intention of remaining in 
the host country in the long term, yet whose political attitudes may have been shaped 
already by their migration experience.  
The key issue is whether migrant voters adopt the norms and values prevailing in the 
host country or whether the very choice of the destination country is in fact affected by 
the migrants’ original political attitudes. Clearly, correlation between institutional and 
political variables and voting behavior is not indicative of causality. Migrants are likely 
to have different socio-economic characteristics than the stayers (as is evident from the 
fact that typically only a small fraction of a country’s population leaves). For instance, 
migrants may be more entrepreneurial and respond more readily to economic 
opportunities. However, to ascribe the variation in migrants’ voting behavior across 
countries to self-selection, a theory which predicts that different countries attract types of 
migrants is needed. The traditional migration theory emphasizes earnings differentials 
(see Todaro, 1969, and Harris and Todaro, 1970) and as such it can be applied to predict   15
the size of the migration flow but not the migrants’ socio-economic characteristics or 
political attitudes. Borjas (1987 and 1991, building on Roy, 1951), in contrast, argues that 
migration decisions also depend on the dispersion of earnings in the alternative 
destinations. Accordingly, highly skilled and productive workers move to countries with 
widely dispersed earnings, as that is where their skills yield the highest return. In 
contrast, unskilled workers are more likely to choose destinations with highly equal 
distribution of earnings, as in these countries their low productivity is less penalized. 
Accordingly, highly productive and entrepreneurial individuals – who tend to form the 
natural constituency of right-wing parties – would gain from moving to countries such as 
the US but also from moving to post-communist and developing countries with high 
levels of wage inequality (e.g. Russia or Brazil). On the other hand, blue-collar and less 
productive white-collar workers would gain more from moving to highly egalitarian 
countries such as continental Western Europe.  
Political motivations could well be another source of self-selection of migrants. Non-
negligible numbers of dissenters and political refugees left the Czech Republic and 
Poland during the communist period. Thus, migrants who moved to communist countries 
at that time were likely to be more left leaning, while the dissenters and refugees who 
moved out of the Soviet Block were more likely to be right leaning. There seems, 
however, little reason for political factors to weigh heavily in migration decisions after 
1990, as political repressions ceased in both countries in the wake of the collapse of the 
communist regime. Therefore, inasmuch as the pre-1990 emigrants remained abroad and 
retained their original nationality, one can expect more left-wing (and in particular pro-
communist) voters in other post-communist countries and more right-wing (and possibly 
also social democratic) voters in Western countries.  
 
4. Methodology 
The principal variable of interest in this analysis is the proportion of votes, Vij, that 
party j receives from voters living in country i. Therefore, the data display two specific 
properties: the individual observations lie between 0 and 1, and the proportion of votes 
received by all parties sum to one. The majority of voting studies to date use ordinary   16
least squares (OLS).
19 Yet, as argued by Jackson (2001) and Tomz et al. (2002), OLS is 
inappropriate for analyses of elections in multiparty systems as it does not satisfy either 
of the above-mentioned restrictions. In particular, OLS can result in predicted vote shares 
that are negative, or exceed 1 (that is, 100%). To avoid this, we transformed the vote 















The resulting dependent variable is unbounded (that is, it can take values between −∞ 
and ∞) but is not defined for vote shares of either 0 or 1. As there are several zero 
observations in the data, especially for the communist party, we added 0.001 to all vote 
shares before performing the logit transformation.  
All regressions are estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
model, which takes account of the adding-up constraint characteristic of election data. 
SUR is a special case of generalized least squares, which estimates a set of equations with 
cross-equation constraints imposed. Specifically, it allows for the possibility that the 
residuals are correlated across parties. Therefore, if one party has a large positive 
residual, the others will have small and some negative residuals for that observation. 
Estimating a set of seemingly unrelated regressions jointly as a system yields more 
efficient estimates than estimating them separately, especially as the correlation among 
the errors rises and the correlation among the independent variables falls (Greene, 2000). 
SUR is also particularly efficient when the independent variables differ from one 
equation to the next. Overall SUR is more appropriate and no less efficient or convenient 
than estimating individual OLS equations for each party (Tomz et al., 2002). 
The analysis utilizes information on votes cast by Czech and Polish migrants in 85 
and 90 countries, respectively. Countries in which less than 10 migrants voted were 
omitted from the analysis. This issue only arose in the case of Czech data where 19 
countries had to be dropped. Furthermore, analytic weights are applied in all regressions 
to account for the differing number of migrant voters in each country. Analytic weights 
are appropriate given that the dependent variable in the analysis is the average of all votes 
                                                 
19 Tomz et al. (2002) report that out of nineteen articles analysing multiparty election data published 
in leading political science journal between 1996-2000, eighteen use OLS.   17
cast by migrants in a particular country. Weighing by the number of voters in each 
country takes account of the fact that, for example, 260 votes were cast by Czech citizens 
in France, and only 11 votes cast in Costa Rica.  
As there are no preceding theories to prescribe which factors may influence migrant 
voting behavior, the analysis follows a somewhat agnostic approach: we relate migrant 
votes to a wide array of explanatory variables selected so as to account for three 
alternative hypotheses of migrant voting behavior:  
1. Skill-based economic self-selection  (Roy-Borjas model of migration): Accordingly, 
highly skilled and educated potential migrants are more likely to migrate to 
countries with a high degree of income inequality. Given that highly skilled, 
educated and entrepreneurial individuals tend to vote right-wing parties, income 
inequality should therefore be positively correlated with support for right-wing 
parties and negatively correlated with support for left-wing and former communist 
parties.  
2. Political self-selection: Migrants located in former socialist countries should display 
stronger support for left-wing and especially former communist parties than those in 
Western democracies, and vice versa for right-wing parties.  
3. Adaptive learning: Migrants adapt to the norms and values prevailing in the host 
country. According to this hypothesis, higher support for liberal and democratic 
parties and lower support for left-wing and especially former communist parties 
should be observed in countries with a greater extent and longer tradition of 
democracy and a market economy. Similarly, the voting preferences of migrants 
may be correlated with the prevailing political attitudes (captured by the political 
orientation of the government) and/or economic conditions in the host country.  
To test the adaptive learning hypothesis, we include a number of institutional, 
political and socio-economic indicators pertaining to the host countries. These include, 
first, various measures of democracy
20: indexes of civil liberties and political freedom 
(compiled and reported by the Freedom House); fraction of years between 1972 and 2001 
in which the country was classified by the Freedom House as free, partially free or not 
                                                 
20 Two alternative democracy measures were initially used: the Freedom House Democracy Index and 
the Polity Democracy Index. As the correlation between the 2 indexes (for 2001) is a very high 0.92, we 
use the Freedom House Index due to greater country coverage.   18
free. Second, measures of economic freedom
21 (reported by the Frasier Institute) as 
captured by the following sub-indexes
22: size of government, legal structure and security 
of property rights, sound money, foreign trade liberalization, and regulation. Third, 
various measures of economic development, such as GDP per capita (as of 2000 in 
thousands of US dollars), the economic growth rate and inflation in 2000. Fourth, 
measures of the political environment as captured by an indicator of the political 
orientation of the government (left-wing, centrist/mixed, right-wing, autocratic or 
ethnically/religiously dominated); and the nature of the political system (strong or weak 
presidential or parliamentary).
23 Next, the Gini index is included to account for the skill-
based economic self-selection hypothesis in line with the Roy-Borjas model. Finally, the 
political self-selection hypothesis, which stresses the impact of current or past political 
ties and their legacies, is accounted for by including a number of regional dummy 
variables in all the regressions.
24  
Differentiating between the political self-selection and adaptive learning hypotheses 
is not straightforward, as many of the former socialist countries have low levels of 
democracy and are far from having attained a working market economy. There are, 
however, important differences among the former communist countries. Some, most 
notably the new EU member countries, have made great progress in political and 
economic liberalization since the end of communism, while others have either remained 
at an intermediate level (e.g. Russia, Serbia and Monte Negro or the countries in the 
Caucasus) or have reverted back to repressive and autocratic regimes (Belarus and the 
Central Asian Republics). Moreover, several developing countries (e.g. Iran, Congo or 
Egypt) have similar levels of democracy and/or economic freedom as the former 
communist countries without ever having had a communist past. Note that during the 
communist period, when we expect most of the migration motivated by political self-
                                                 
21 Two alternative measures of economic freedom were also originally used: the Heritage economic 
Freedom Index and the Fraser Economic Freedom Index. The correlation between the 2 indexes is a high 
0.91, and therefore we use the Fraser Index which has greater country coverage. 
22  See Appendix for bivariate correlations of the various sub-indexes. 
23 Data definitions and sources are discussed in greater detail in the Appendix.  
24Both a distance variable (distance from capital to capital as measured by 
www.geobytes.com/CityDistancetool.htm.) and border dummies were also included, however they are only 
significant when the regional variables are not included. As a migrant in the US, for example, may be able 
to sustain a closer relationship with his Polish roots than, for example, one in Romania, due to the larger 
Polish immigrant community in the former and easier access to information.    19
selection to have occurred, it made little difference whether one migrated to Belarus or 
Russia, Serbia or Slovenia, Romania or Slovakia, Viet Nam or North Korea. By 
2001/2002 however, migrants will have found themselves in dramatically different 
political and economic environments. The regional dummies, therefore, should capture 
the similarities that various groups of countries share in terms of political legacies, 
whereas the indicators of democracy and economic freedom should account for the 
differences in their present-day conditions.  
There is a non-negligible correlation between some variables (for example, developed 
countries tend to display relatively high degrees of both economic freedom and 
democracy). Therefore, the coefficient estimates may change substantially depending on 
the other variables included in the model. In addition, given that we have only limited a 
priori expectations about which particular host country characteristics may influence 
migrant voting behavior, we apply a general-to-specific procedure to determine which 
factors are robust.
25 This procedure starts off estimating a general unrestricted regression 
specification, including all possible explanatory variables, which is then tested against 
more parsimonious models (nested within the general model), repeating the testing-down 
procedure until no further variables can be excluded. The result is a model that is less 
complex than the general model but nonetheless contains all the relevant information. 
Although this procedure is sometimes likened to sophisticated data mining, Hoover and 
Perez show that in most cases (on average 80%), the general-to-specific procedure 
succeeds in identifying the true data-generating model or a closely related model (i.e. one 
that encompasses the true model but contains additional irrelevant variables that the 
procedure fails to eliminate). We implemented the procedure manually, using STATA, 
repeating the step-wise testing-down procedure until the exclusion tests became 
significant at least at the 10% level (we choose this moderate threshold in view of the 
relatively small number of observations). At each step, the least significant variable for 
each party was tested and eliminated, testing for variables at similar levels of significance 
(as a general rule, only variables whose significance was no more than 30 percentage 
points off the least significant one were tested at each step, so that, for example, if the 
                                                 
25 For an explanation and assessment of this methodology, see Hoover and Perez, 1999, and the 
references cited therein.    20
lowest significance level was 50%, variables that appeared with up to 20% significance 
level were included in the exclusion test).  
 
5. Determinants of Migrant Voting Behavior 
This section presents the results of the empirical analysis of migrant votes in the last 
Czech and Polish parliamentary elections. As discussed above, in the absence of a theory 
of migrant voting behavior and in view of the large number of potentially relevant 
variables, the analysis is carried out using the general-to-specific procedure, starting with 
the most general unrestricted model, which is gradually slimmed down until all 
insignificant variables are dropped (with the significance threshold set at the 10 % level). 
The analysis is performed using two alternative indexes of democracy (both compiled by 
the Freedom House). The indexes measure two different aspects of democracy: civil 
liberties (freedom of expression and association, religious and educational freedom) and 
political rights (universal franchise, organization of free elections with participation open 
to all groups within society). The two indexes are very closely correlated (the correlation 
coefficient across the countries in our sample is 0.94). Therefore, to avoid 
multicollinearity, we estimate two models for each country, one including the civil 
liberties index and one with the political rights index, rather than including both indexes 
in parallel as we do with the remaining variables.  
As discussed above, the migrant votes are regressed on a number of host country 
institutional, political and economic characteristics, a measure of income inequality, and 
a number of regional dummies (with Western Europe being the omitted category), so as 
to control for the three alternative hypotheses of migrant voting behavior. In addition, 
two country specific dummies were included. First, the votes from Italy include also 
those from the Czech and Polish consulates in the Vatican, a large fraction of which was 
probably cast by clergymen and theology students. Therefore, as their political attitudes 
may be significantly different from those of the rest of the electorate, especially with 
respect to support for Christian-democratic parties, a dummy for Italy was included. 
Second, the US has a large number of Polish immigrants, who are often allowed to retain   21
their Polish nationality after acquiring US citizenship.
26 This potentially makes the 
American-Polish immigrant community different from Polish migrants in other countries 
(where typically they would have to give up their Polish nationality in order to become 
naturalized citizens of the host country – and thus would not be eligible to vote in Polish 
elections): the former have lived in the host country much longer (or may even have been 
born there) and therefore probably keep much looser contacts with the ancestral country. 
Furthermore, as members of a relatively large and geographically concentrated 
community, American Poles are more likely to retain their own unique identity (which 
may also be markedly different from that in present-day Poland) than migrants living in 
other countries where they are less numerous and more dispersed. Although the Czech 
migrant population in the US appears neither particularly large nor geographically 
concentrated (and the Czech Republic does not permit its nationals to acquire another 
nationality while remaining Czech citizens), for the sake of comparability we also 
included the US dummy in the Czech regressions.  
The results obtained for the general unrestricted models are reported in Appendix A. 
Tables 3 and 4 present the final results for those explanatory variables that survived the 
elimination by the general-to-specific procedure. We analyze the votes cast for five 
Czech and seven Polish political parties; the results for each party are reported in separate 
tables labeled A-E in the Czech regressions and A-G in the Polish regressions. Not 
surprisingly, given the large number of explanatory variables and the low number of 
observations, not many variables appear significant in the general unrestricted models. 
Applying the general-to-specific methodology, however, greatly reduces the number of 
explanatory variables. Out of a total of 130 explanatory variables in the Czech 
regressions, 78 and 74 are eliminated as insignificant in the regression with civil liberties 
and political rights, respectively. For Poland, the corresponding ‘drop-out’ rate is even 
higher: 147 and 130 variables out of a total of 196.  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.  
                                                 
26 Other countries also allow dual nationality, however, the US case seems exceptional in view of the 
size and regional concentration of the Polish emigrant community and its ability to retain a separate identity 
and culture.    22
 
The key question of interest, however, is which variables survive the testing-down 
procedure and what does that tell us about the validity of the three hypotheses formulated 
in the preceding section. The evidence is least favorable for the skill-based self-selection 
hypothesis, which posits that host-country income inequality is correlated with migrants’ 
skills: highly skilled migrants choose high-inequality destinations, while those with low 
skills prefer more egalitarian societies. Conversely, votes for right-wing parties should be 
positively correlated with income inequality while those for left-wing parties display a 
negative correlation with income inequality. To test this motive for migration, the Gini 
coefficient was included among the explanatory variables. However, the general-to-
specific procedure eliminated it completely from the regressions with Czech migrant 
votes. In the Polish regressions, income inequality survived the testing-down and is 
correlated with votes for the SLD-UP (coalition of the Party of Democratic Left and the 
Union of Labor) and the PiS (Law and Justice) parties only. The expected pattern is only 
confirmed for the PiS which, being a right-wing party, indeed derives greater support 
from countries with high income inequality. The votes for the SLD, however, are also 
positively correlated with income inequality (in the regression with political rights), 
contrary to the hypothesis. For all the remaining parties, the indicator of income 
inequality was eliminated by the testing-down procedure.  
Tables 3 and 4 also reveal that several of the regional dummy variables survive to the 
end, thus potentially indicating support for the political self-selection hypothesis. This 
hypothesis stipulates that support for left-wing and post-communist parties should be 
stronger, and support for right-wing parties weaker, in the former communist countries. 
The opposite should hold for Western democracies i.e. support for left-wing parties 
should be lower compared to support for right-wing parties. The evidence, however, is at 
best mixed. While many regional dummy variables are eliminated by the general-to-
specific procedure, when they do remain, they frequently appear with the wrong sign. In 
particular, the support for the KSCM (Czech Communist Party) is not any higher in the 
former communist countries than in Western Europe or in Anglo-Saxon countries (in 
fact, the only regional variable that survives the testing down for the Communists is the 
dummy for Italy where is appears with a negative coefficient). In addition, contrary to the   23
political self-selection hypothesis, the CSSD (Czech Social Democrats), draws 
significantly fewer votes from Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
Similarly, the Polish SLD-UP fared poorly in the former Soviet Union, whereas it fared 
well in the US. The results are similarly mixed for right-wing parties. Among Czech 
parties, the ODS (Civic Democratic Party) draws less support in Central/Eastern Europe, 
as predicted by the hypothesis, but the opposite is true for the KDU-US (coalition of 
Christian Democrats and Union of Freedom). Among Polish migrant voters, the AWSP 
(Solidarity Electoral Action) fared well in the former Soviet Union despite its deep anti-
communist roots – and poorly in the US. The support for the UW (Union of Freedom) is 
low in the Anglo-Saxon countries and especially in the US, despite its liberal pro-market 
nature. Only the PO (Citizens’ Platform) received fewer votes from the former Soviet 
Union, as predicted by the hypothesis. Surprisingly, the support for the LPR (extreme-
right League of Polish Families) is strong in Central/Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union and also in the US.  
In contrast to the two self-selection hypotheses, the evidence with respect to the 
adaptive learning hypothesis is more encouraging. We account both for the extent of 
democracy (measured with the Freedom House indexes of civil liberties and political 
rights) and the tradition of democracy (measured as the fraction of years between 1972 
and 2001 that the country was classified by the Freedom House as free or partially free) 
in the host countries. The latter may be important as it distinguishes countries that 
democratized recently from those that espoused high degrees of democracy for decades. 
Striking similarities appear both across parties, and across the two countries included in 
our analysis. On the one hand, the effect of democracy on migrant votes is mixed: it is 
positively significant and hump-shaped for every Czech political party, (with the 
maximum effect attained at an intermediate level of democracy), apart from the KDU-
US
27, for either one or both of the civil liberties/political rights indexes, while in the 
Polish regressions, high levels of democracy are positively related to votes for the 
AWSP, PiS and LPR, negatively related to votes for SLD-UP and UW, and U-shaped for 
the PO. However, the impact of the tradition of democracy is quite consistent: countries 
                                                 
27 For KDU-US, the pattern appears U-shaped, however, with the minimum attained at the political 
rights index equal to 0.05. As the index ranges between 0 and 10, the impact of political rights on votes for 
this party is effectively positive.    24
with a longer tradition of full or moderate democracy show less support for the left-wing 
parties – CSSD and KSCM – and stronger support for the right-wing parties – KDU-US, 
UW, PO and, somewhat surprisingly (given its extremist nature), also LPR.  
The results obtained with the various sub-indexes of economic freedom are mixed but 
again reveal some consistencies. Most notably, migrants in countries with less pervasive 
regulation are more likely to vote in favor of right-wing parties – ODS, KDU-US, 
AWSP, UW, PO and LPR than left-wing parties – CSSD, KSCM and SLD-UP. The 
estimated effects of the other sub-indexes are more mixed, often with one or two sub-
indexes appearing significant and with signs opposite to that of the regulation sub-
index.
28 Due to this, the joint impact of economic freedom is in fact weaker than it would 
appear if only the regulation sub-index was included. Nonetheless, comparing the sizes of 
the estimated coefficients for the various sub-indexes, the impact of economic freedom 
appears clearly positive for the KDU-US, AWSP, UW and LPR, and negative for SLD-
UP.
29  
The impact of economic development (measured by the GDP per capita) is similar to 
that of economic freedom: migrants in richer and more advanced countries show greater 
support for right-wing parties, KDU-US, UW and PiS, at the expense of left-wing parties, 
CSSD and KSCM. This pattern, however, appears somewhat less robust as it is only 
obtained for a subset of parties. In contrast to economic development, the results for 
economic performance (economic growth and inflation), while appearing significant for 
some parties, are mixed and do not conform to a clear-cut pattern across parties and the 
two countries. Czech migrants in high-inflation countries show greater support for left-
wing parties, CSSD and KSCM, than for ODS, but this pattern is not replicated in the 
Polish data. The weak and mixed results for economic performance variables should not 
come as surprising. Typically, the literature on economic voting finds that voters punish 
governments for bad economic performance by voting for the opposition and reward 
them for good performance by reelecting them. However, the host country’s economic 
                                                 
28 The various sub-indexes of economic freedom are moderately strongly correlated with each other 
(correlation coefficients between 0.51 and 0.66), with the exception of the size of government, which is 
essentially uncorrelated with the other sub-indexes (correlation coefficients range between –0.32 and 0.20), 
see table C1 in the Appendix. 
29 As for these parties, either regulation is the only sub-index that remains significant after performing 
the general-to-specific procedure, or it dominates, in absolute value, the coefficients obtained for the other 
sub-indexes.    25
conditions have little relevance for passing a verdict on the competence of the 
government in the migrants’ home country.  
Similarly, variables reflecting the nature of the political environment in the host 
country – political orientation of the government and the type of political system 
(parliamentary, strong presidential or weak presidential) frequently appear significant but 
it is difficult to identify a systematic pattern in the results. Sometimes, the results defy 
expectations. For example, the KDU-US, UW and PO, being all right-of-center parties, 
do well among migrants who live in countries with left-wing governments, whereas the 
CSSD does poorly in such countries. For other parties, the pattern is more in line with 
expectations: the UW also does well in countries with a centrist or mixed government, 
while the PiS and LPR do poorly in countries with either centrist/mixed or left-wing 
government. Therefore, while the political environment seems to have an effect on 
migrants’ political preferences, the precise nature of this effect is not very clear.
30 
Overall, the results provide more consistent support for the adaptive learning hypothesis 
than for either the political or economic self-selection hypotheses, suggesting that 




This paper analyzes the voting behavior of Czech and Polish migrants who 
participated in their countries’ most recent national elections by casting their votes from 
abroad. Evidence from these elections indicates that the voting behavior of migrants 
differs substantially from that of their compatriots at home. Moreover, the preferences of 
migrants vary significantly also across the various host countries. In this paper we 
consider three alternative hypotheses that could potentially explain these differences: 
adaptive learning (i.e. migrants gradually adopt the norms and values prevailing in the 
host country and this influences their voting political preferences accordingly), 
                                                 
30 Note that finding a strong impact of the political orientation of the host country’s government on 
migrant voting behavior could be interpreted also as evidence in favor of the political self-selection 
hypothesis. One would need information of the migrants voting histories to differentiate between political 
self-selection and adaptive learning. Given that the results are mixed, this problem does not arise in our 
case though.    26
economically-based self-selection (migrants move to countries where the payoff to their 
human capital is highest), and finally political self-selection (migrants’ political attitudes 
before migration determine the choice of destination countries).  
The analysis considers a wide range of potential determinants of migrant voting 
behavior, motivated by three alternative hypotheses. To determine which factors robustly 
affect votes from abroad, the general to specific methodology is applied to a long list of 
potential explanatory variables. This method reduces the general unrestricted model to a 
more parsimonious one, containing only significant variables. The results of the slimmed-
down model provide only little support for the self-selection hypotheses, whether on 
economic or political grounds. In contrast, the results give strong indications that 
migrants’ voting behavior is indeed shaped by the institutional environment prevailing in 
the host country. In particular, right-wing parties tend to fare well, and left-wing parties 
do poorly, among migrants living in countries with a long tradition of full or partial 
democracy and/or a greater extent of economic freedom. Similarly, right-wing parties 
derive more support from migrants living in economically advanced countries, while the 
opposite holds true for left-wing parties. The results, however, are more mixed and less 
clear-cut in regards the impact of economic performance (growth and inflation) and the 
political environment (i.e. political orientation of the incumbent government, and whether 
the political system is presidential or weakly/strongly presidential).  
These findings suggest that voters tend to adapt to the values and norms prevailing in 
their current surroundings and as these norms change, so too does voting behavior. 
Migration is an extreme case of such a societal change but a similar process is likely to be 
at play in countries undergoing fundamental economic and political transitions. Therefore 
we can expect that far-reaching regime changes (whether initiated from within or 
without), when sustained for sufficiently long, will be subsequently accompanied by 
changes in attitudes and political preferences. Given that the majority of the society must 
change, the pace of such transformations will be much more gradual than in the case of 
migration.  
The results underscore the potential impact of migration on political and economic 
change in countries that currently are, or recently were, ruled by authoritarian and 
interventionist governments. Migrants can play an important political role directly, as the   27
examples enumerated in footnote 3 illustrate. Even more importantly, returning migrants, 
who have adopted the democratic and liberal views of their host country, are likely to 
demand democratic institutions and liberal economic policies and join grass-roots support 
structures for like-minded parties in their home countries. Whether or not this effect is 
sufficiently pronounced, however, depends upon the ability of migrants to retain these 
liberal attitudes upon return to their home countries, despite the non-liberal norms and 
values that may still prevail there.  
A critical aspect of the migration experience is that it teaches migrants that there are 
alternatives to the economic and political system prevailing at home, and that these 
alternatives may indeed deliver superior outcomes. This is especially the case for 
migrants coming from authoritarian and repressive countries. Consider a migrant from 
pre-perestroika Russia or present-day North Korea arriving in Western Europe or the US. 
The impact of seeing first-hand the disparity between the picture of the West painted by 
the migrant’s home country’s authorities and the reality of Western society may seriously 
undermine the migrant’s indoctrinated beliefs. Similarly, for countries such as the Czech 
Republic and Poland which are currently undertaking economic and political reforms, the 
goal of a liberal democracy and functioning market economy may appear very elusive 
compared to the economic hardships which their countries experienced in the course of 
transition. While the citizens of such countries are no longer subject to communist 
propaganda and many may have visited Western countries, the experience of having lived 
in developed democratic countries is likely to have a more profound impression.  
Not surprisingly, repressive regimes often curtail their citizens’ freedom to travel. 
Communist countries (whether the former Soviet block or present-day Cuba and North 
Korea) are prime examples of this. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the reason is 
not the fear that freedom to travel would result in the rapid depopulation of authoritarian 
countries. Rather, repressive regimes seem more concerned that emigrants would 
eventually return home and help build up a constituency in favor of political change. The 
former communist countries, for example, typically stripped emigrants of nationality, 
thereby precluding them from returning home later. Turkmenistan – a present-day 
dictatorial regime in Central Asia – went even further: not only does it severely restrict its 
citizens’ movement across borders, but recently, Turkmen nationals who also held   28
Russian passports (and as such were relatively free to travel) were recently forced either 
to relinquish their Russian nationality or emigrate.
31  
Thus, by opening their borders to immigrants, especially those from authoritarian and 
transition countries, developed countries can help spread liberal values and attitudes to 
these regions. This potentially important implication of migration, however, does not 
seem widely understood or appreciated in the main host countries.  
 
                                                 
31 According to one report, Turkmen teachers who obtained their education abroad have been 
prohibited from exercising their profession, see RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 73, Part I, 16 April 2003.    29
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 Table 1 Czech Election Results 2002 















1   30.12 18.55 24.51 14.28  0.51 12.04  4,757,884 
Results from Abroad  25.33  2.75 27.71 33.99  1.71  8.50  3,742 
  Former Soviet Union  37.79  7.37  25.35  17.51  2.30  9.68  217 
  Central and East European  30.28  6.90  28.03  25.35  0.99  8.45  710 
  Western Europe  20.72  1.20  26.95  42.07  1.32  7.75  1,588 
  Asia  19.25  0.53  39.57  24.60  2.67  13.37  187 
  North Africa and Middle-East   44.96  3.17  24.78  15.85  1.15  10.09  347 
  Sub-Sahara Africa  17.89  1.05  35.79  32.63  5.26  7.37  95 
  Australia  8.47  1.69  27.12  54.24  1.69  6.78  59 
  Central and South America  32.74  1.79  23.81  27.98  3.57  10.12  168 
  Northern America  14.29  0.54  28.30  47.17  2.70  7.01  371 
Notes: The party acronyms stand for Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 
(KSCM), Civic Democratic Party (ODS), Coalition of Christian Democratic Union-Peoples Party of Czechoslovakia, Union 
of Freedom and Democratic Union (Coalition), and Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA).  
1 Includes votes from abroad.  
Source: Czech Statistical Office.Table 2 Polish Parliamentary Election Results 2001 





















1  41.04 5.60  3.10 10.20 9.50  8.98 12.68 7.87  1.02  13,017,929
Results from Abroad  25.98 7.37 10.02 1.37 19.04 1.90 15.88  17.84 0.60  26,200 
  Former Soviet Union  44.55  7.30  8.83  0.84  11.06  2.84  13.29  10.83  0.46  1,302 
  Central and East Europe  44.49  5.28  10.02  1.58  11.02  2.54  18.21  5.86  1.00  2,405 
  Western Europe  25.65  9.54  12.88  1.45  17.55  1.55  18.28  12.66  0.45  10,651 
  Asia  43.56  5.81  19.96  0.18  7.99  1.63  18.87  1.63  0.36  551 
  North Africa / Middle-East  48.93  1.98  12.69  2.39  8.81  2.55  17.87  3.46  1.32  1,214 
  Sub-Sahara Africa  29.37  12.21  19.80  1.65  8.91  3.63  19.80  3.30  1.32  303 
    Australia  27.15  10.60  10.60 1.55 27.15 0.44 11.26  11.04 0.22  453 
  Central/South America  26.33  11.47  16.32  1.29  10.18  3.55  22.46  5.65  2.75  619 
  Northern America  13.97  5.53  4.87  1.22  26.96  1.83  11.85  33.31  0.46  8,702 
Notes: The party acronyms stand for Coalition of Democratic Left and Union of Labor (SLD-UP), Solidarity Electoral Action (AWSP), Union of Freedom 
(UW), Self defense of the Polish Republic (SO), Law and Justice (PiS), Polish People's Party (PSL), Citizens' Platform (PO), and League of Polish Families 
(LPR).  
1 Includes votes from abroad.  
Source: Polish Central Electoral Commission.  
 Table 3 Czech Republic: General-to-Specific Results 
A. Civic Democratic Party (ODS)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  0.114*** (0.037) 0.443*** (0.114) 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared      -0.043***  (0.010) 
EF: Sound Money  -0.136***  (0.037)  -0.099***  (0.038) 
EF: Regulation      0.180***  (0.063) 
Inflation [%]      -0.020**  (0.008) 
Gov.: authoritarian  0.774**  (0.322)     
Parliamentary  0.255**  (0.105) 0.374*** (0.109) 
Central/Eastern Europe  -0.423***  (0.146)     
South East Asia  0.680***  (0.230)     
Central/Latin America      -0.445**  (0.211) 
Italy  -0.609***  (0.192) -0.476** (0.206) 
Constant  -0.883*** (0.249) -1.651*** (0.428) 
R-squared 0.400  0.410 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction years not free omitted); 
Size of government, Legal/property rights, Foreign trade; GDP per capita, GDP growth, Centrist/mixed, 
Left-wing and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral 
system (strong presidential omitted); Former Soviet Union, Middle East and North Africa, Anglo-Saxon, 
United States (Europe omitted).  
 
B. Czech Social Democratic   
Party (CSSD) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  0.470**  (0.213) 0.275*** (0.080) 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  -0.045***  (0.014)     
Fraction Years Free  -1.417**  (0.693)  -2.080***  (0.805) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  -1.639***  (0.591)  -2.532***  (0.622) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.444***  (0.133)     
EF: Sound Money      0.181*  (0.102) 
EF:  Regulation  -0.369*** (0.117) -0.293*** (0.115) 
GDP per capita (US$ thousands)  -0.058***  (0.021)  -0.046***  (0.016) 
Inflation [%]  0.028***  (0.011)  0.036**  (0.015) 
Gov.: Left wing  -0.375*  (0.198)     
Gov.:  authoritarian  2.050*** (0.556) 2.376*** (0.534) 
Parliamentary -0.507***  (0.202)  -0.298*  (0.170) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  -1.089*** (0.412) -1.315*** (0.433) 
Former Soviet Union  -1.942***  (0.630)     
South East Asia  -0.902***  (0.363)     
Middle East/North Africa  -2.592***  (0.654)  -1.184**  (0.533) 
Italy  -1.031*** (0.344) -1.117*** (0.334) 
Constant  0.130 (0.908) -0.357 (0.844) 
R-squared 0.529  0.515 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Fraction years not free (omitted); Size of government, Foreign trade; 
GDP growth, Centrist/mixed, and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak 
presidential electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Latin America (Europe omitted).  
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C. Communist Party of Bohemia  
and Moravia (KSCM) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom  1.698***  (0.450)     
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  -0.137*** (0.036) 0.026*** (0.010) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -5.057*** (1.079) -3.350*** (1.144) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  -5.468***  (1.153)  -3.442***  (1.092) 
EF: Size of Government  0.242**  (0.128)     
EF: Legal/Property Rights  1.022***  (0.250)  1.013***  (0.288) 
EF: Foreign Trade  0.477**  (0.262)  0.710***  (0.271) 
EF:  Regulation  -0.999***  (0.313) -0.752** (0.269) 
GDP per capita (US$ thousands)      -0.116***  (0.055) 
Inflation [%]      0.054**  (0.023) 
Parliamentary  -1.623*** (0.420) -2.031*** (0.458) 
Italy  -2.260***  (0.795) -1.590** (0.794) 
Constant  -9.762*** (2.285) -9.224*** (2.405) 
R-squared 0.526  0.544 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Fraction years not free (omitted); Sound Money; GDP growth, 
Centrist/mixed, Left-wing, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government 
omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, Former 
Soviet Union, South-east Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Central/Latin America, Anglo-Saxon, United 
States (Europe omitted).  
 
D. Coalition (KDU-US)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom      -0.142**  (0.062) 
Fraction Years Free      1.447**  (0.662) 
Fraction Years Partially Free      0.917*  (0.499) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  -0.350***  (0.098)  -0.275***  (0.089) 
EF:  Regulation  0.590*** (0.096) 0.501*** (0.107) 
GDP per capita (US$ thousands)  0.077***  (0.017)  0.057***  (0.016) 
Gov.: Left wing  0.349**  (0.162)  0.253*  (0.132) 
Parliamentary  0.428*** (0.147) 0.363*** (0.142) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  0.516*** (0.169) 1.057*** (0.340) 
South East Asia      -0.389*  (0.234) 
Middle East/North Africa      -0.630**  (0.318) 
Anglo-Saxon -0.365**  (0.150)  -0.289*  (0.154) 
Italy  1.558*** (0.261) 1.464*** (0.253) 
Constant  -3.800*** (0.526) -3.263*** (0.560) 
R-squared 0.763  0.794 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/Political Freedom Squared; Fraction years free and Partially free 
(Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government, Sound money, and Foreign trade; GDP growth, 
Inflation, Centrist/mixed, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government 
omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (Strong presidential omitted); Former Soviet Union, 
Central/Latin America (Europe omitted).    36
 
E. Others  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom  0.225***  (0.068)     
Civil/Political Freedom Squared      0.014**  (0.007) 
Fraction Years Free  -0.926**  (0.428)  -2.680***  (0.642) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights      0.380***  (0.098) 
EF: Sound Money  -0.234**  (0.107)  -0.384***  (0.120) 
EF: Foreign Trade      -0.205*  (0.114) 
EF: Regulation  0.374***  (0.111)  0.264**  (0.137) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.067*** (0.016) -0.070*** (0.017) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  -0.570*** (0.153) -0.573*** (0.174) 
Gov.: Left wing
1     -0.490**  (0.208) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  -2.007*** (0.665) -1.960*** (0.664) 
Central/Eastern Europe      -1.462***  (0.404) 
Former Soviet Union  1.956***  (0.612)     
South East Asia  0.904**  (0.379)     
Middle East/North Africa  3.680***  (0.711)  1.746***  (0.647) 
Anglo-Saxon     -0.614***  (0.235) 
United States  -0.707**  (0.290)     
Constant  -3.494***  (0.819) -0.360 (1.054) 
R-squared 0.471  0.472 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Fraction years partially free (Fraction years not free omitted); Size of 
government; GDP per capita, GDP growth, Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); 
Weak presidential and Parliamentary electoral system (Strong presidential omitted); Central/Latin America, 
and Italy (Europe omitted).  
Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
χ
2(10) = 36.30***  χ
2(10) = 36.98*** 
Notes: Number of observations is 54. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) model and applying the General-to-Specific procedure. Analytic weights are 
applied using the total number of votes per country. A dummy for Italy is added because votes from Italy 
also include those from the Vatican. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
The Breusch-Pagan test of independence indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of independence of 
the residuals across the equations in each of the Polish and Czech regressions. Therefore, OLS estimates 
would be inconsistent and the choice of SUR is justified. 
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Table 4 Poland: General-to-Specific Results 
A. Coalition of Democratic Left 
and Union of Labor (SLD-UP) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  -0.005***  (0.002)     
EF: Legal/Property Rights      -0.112***  (0.033) 
EF: Foreign Trade      0.178***  (0.047) 
EF:  Regulation  -0.296*** (0.055) -0.421*** (0.039) 
Gini Index      0.014**  (0.006) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed  0.296***  (0.077)  0.383***  (0.076) 
Gov.:  ethnic/religious  0.401**  (0.185) 0.613*** (0.214) 
Parliamentary 0.313***  (0.081)     
Former Soviet Union      -0.706***  (0.196) 
Sub-Saharan Africa      -0.794***  (0.239) 
Central/Latin America      -0.692***  (0.190) 
Anglo-Saxon -0.216**  (0.097)     
United States  0.366***  (0.116)     
Italy  -1.331*** (0.129) -1.516*** (0.122) 
Constant 1.011***  (0.304)  0.742*  (0.393) 
R-squared 0.856  0.865 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom; Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction 
years not free omitted); Size of government, Sound money; GDP per capita, GDP growth, Inflation, Left-
wing and Authoritarian government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system 
(strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, South East Asia, Middle East and North Africa 
(Europe omitted).  
 
B. Solidarity Electoral Action 
(AWSP) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
EF:  Regulation  0.235*** (0.083) 0.245*** (0.083) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  -0.186*** (0.045) -0.199*** (0.046) 
Former  Soviet  Union  0.990*** (0.371) 1.136*** (0.392) 
United  States  -0.567*** (0.185) -0.545*** (0.184) 
Italy  1.760*** (0.299) 1.830*** (0.295) 
Constant  -3.477*** (0.592) -3.516*** (0.591) 
R-squared 0.509  0.513 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom (linear and squared); Fraction years free and 
Partially free (Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government, Legal/property rights, Sound money, 
Foreign trade; GDP per capita; Gini Index; Inflation, Centrist/mixed, Left-wing, Authoritarian and 
Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential and Parliamentary 
electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, South East Asia, Middle East and 
North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central/Latin America, Anglo-Saxon, (Europe omitted).    38
 
C. Union of Freedom (UW)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom  -0.096***  (0.037)     
Fraction Years Partially Free  0.751***  (0.285)  0.674***  (0.269) 
EF:  Regulation  0.366*** (0.078) 0.334*** (0.077) 
GDP per capita  0.015*  (0.009)  0.018**  (0.009) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed      0.370***  (0.116) 
Gov.: Left wing      0.334***  (0.116) 
Gov.: authoritarian      0.734**  (0.351) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious      0.542**  (0.242) 
Parliamentary     -0.304**  (0.128) 
South East Asia      0.400*  (0.235) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.702*** (0.135) -0.616*** (0.131) 
United  States  -1.043*** (0.127) -1.310*** (0.180) 
Constant  -3.840*** (0.405) -4.503*** (0.431) 
R-squared 0.747  0.793 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom squared; Fraction years free (Fraction years not 
free omitted); Size of government, Legal/property rights, Sound money, Foreign trade; Gini Index; GDP 
growth, Inflation, Centrist/mixed, Left-wing, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing 
government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern 
Europe, Former Soviet Union, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central/Latin America, 
Italy (Europe omitted).  
 
D. Law and Justice (PiS)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  0.004*  (0.002)     
EF: Foreign Trade  0.200***  (0.071)     
GDP per capita (US$ thousands)      0.022***  (0.006) 
Gini  Index  0.025*** (0.008) 0.024*** (0.008) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed  -0.300***  (0.122)  -0.310***  (0.124) 
Gov.: Left wing  -0.313***  (0.120)  -0.344***  (0.107) 
Gov.:  ethnic/religious  -0.772*** (0.269) -0.825*** (0.257) 
Parliamentary -0.226**  (0.104)     
South East Asia  -0.449*  (0.271)  -0.661**  (0.273) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -1.204***  (0.373) -0.946** (0.409) 
Central/Latin  America  -1.270*** (0.279) -1.097*** (0.311) 
Constant  -3.963*** (0.627) -2.664*** (0.312) 
R-squared 0.705  0.698 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom; Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction 
years not free omitted); Size of government, Legal/property rights, Sound money, Regulation; GDP growth, 
Inflation, Authoritarian government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak presidential electoral system 
(strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, Middle East and North Africa, 
Anglo-Saxon, United States, Italy (Europe omitted).    39
 
E. Citizens’ Platform (PO)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom      -0.555***  (0.143) 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared      0.043***  (0.013) 
Fraction Years Partially Free      0.597*  (0.339) 
EF: Size of Government  -0.089***  (0.028)  -0.076***  (0.021) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights      0.064*  (0.037) 
EF: Regulation  0.083**  (0.043)     
GDP  Growth  [%]  0.060** (0.027) 0.068** (0.028) 
Inflation [%]      0.018***  (0.007) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed  0.468***  (0.092)  0.555***  (0.085) 
Gov.: Left wing  0.457***  (0.102)  0.424***  (0.087) 
Gov.: authoritarian      -0.710*  (0.427) 
Weak presidential      0.930**  (0.396) 
Former Soviet Union      -0.633**  (0.317) 
South East Asia      -0.696**  (0.296) 
Middle East/North Africa      -0.622*  (0.362) 
Central/Latin  America  0.619*** (0.231) 0.678*** (0.257) 
Constant  -2.212***  (0.316) -1.118** (0.492) 
R-squared 0.457  0.561 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom; Fraction years free (Fraction years not free 
omitted); Sound money, Foreign trade; GDP per capita; Gini Index; Ethnic/religious government (Right-
wing government omitted); Parliamentary electoral system (strong presidential omitted); Central/Eastern 
Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Anglo-Saxon, United States, Italy (Europe omitted).  
 
F. League of Polish Families 
(LPR) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Fraction  Years  Free  2.009*** (0.389) 1.702*** (0.394) 
EF:  Regulation  0.482*** (0.083) 0.373*** (0.123) 
GDP Growth [%]      -0.095**  (0.048) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed  -1.148***  (0.188)  -1.383***  (0.225) 
Gov.: Left wing      -0.370*  (0.205) 
Gov.:  ethnic/religious  -2.179*** (0.532) -2.448*** (0.584) 
Parliamentary     0.565***  (0.221) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  1.523*** (0.317) 1.340*** (0.294) 
Former  Soviet  Union  3.709*** (0.500) 4.247*** (0.559) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.968*  (0.595)     
United States      0.671**  (0.295) 
Constant  -6.801*** (0.557) -5.807*** (0.783) 
R-squared 0.732  0.756 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom (linear and squared); Fraction years partially free 
(Fraction years not free omitted); Size of government, Legal/property rights, Sound money, Foreign trade; 
GDP per capita; Gini Index; Inflation, Authoritarian government (Right-wing government omitted); Weak 
presidential electoral system (strong presidential omitted); South East Asia, Middle East and North Africa, 
Central/Latin America, Anglo-Saxon, Italy (Europe omitted).  
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G. Others  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared      0.009***  (0.004) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.211**  (0.091)     
GDP per capita (US$ thousands)  -0.058***  (0.018)  -0.045***  (0.012) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed  -0.292*  (0.157)  -0.321**  (0.158) 
South East Asia  -1.212***  (0.413)  -1.064***  (0.414) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.553***  (0.186) -0.398** (0.178) 
United  States  1.029*** (0.233) 0.923*** (0.209) 
Constant  -3.654*** (0.447) -3.079*** (0.251) 
R-squared 0.343  0.349 
Excluded and Omitted Variables: Civil/political freedom; Fraction years free and Partially free (Fraction 
years not free omitted); Size of government, Sound money, Foreign trade, Regulation; Gini Index; GDP 
growth, Inflation, Left-wing, Authoritarian and Ethnic/religious government (Right-wing government 
omitted); Weak presidential and Parliamentary electoral system (strong presidential omitted); 
Central/Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Central/Latin America, Italy (Europe omitted).  
 
Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
χ
2(21) =77.13***  χ
2(21) = 80.51*** 
Notes: Number of observations is 66. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) model and applying the General-to-Specific procedure. Analytic weights are 
applied using the total number of votes per country. A dummy for Italy is added because votes from Italy 
also include those from the Vatican. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
The Breusch-Pagan test of independence indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of independence of 
the residuals across the equations in each of the Polish and Czech regressions. Therefore, OLS estimates 
would be inconsistent and the choice of SUR is justified. 




Table A1 Czech Republic: General Unrestricted Model Specification 
A. Civic Democratic Party (ODS)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom  0.109  (0.210)  0.417**  (0.211) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  -0.001  (0.014) -0.038** (0.017) 
Fraction  Years  Free  0.129 (0.645) 0.005 (0.706) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  0.083  (0.582)  -0.329  (0.637) 
EF: Size of Government  0.049  (0.057)  0.072  (0.054) 
EF:  Legal/Property  Rights  0.077 (0.117) 0.025 (0.117) 
EF:  Sound  Money  -0.132 (0.110) -0.145 (0.106) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  0.022 (0.092) 0.003 (0.089) 
EF:  Regulation  0.077 (0.127) 0.113 (0.127) 
GDP  per  capita  -0.024 (0.025) -0.010 (0.024) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  0.007 (0.031) -0.002 (0.029) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.002 (0.014) -0.015 (0.015) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  0.051 (0.163) -0.025 (0.155) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  0.059 (0.192) 0.041 (0.181) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  0.667 (0.552) 0.387 (0.511) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  -0.137 (0.405) -0.276 (0.379) 
Weak presidential
2  -0.140 (0.362) -0.130 (0.349) 
Parliamentary
2  0.154 (0.197) 0.240 (0.193) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  -0.350 (0.411) -0.317 (0.407) 
Former  Soviet  Union  0.110 (0.700) -0.387 (0.680) 
South East Asia  0.666*  (0.374)  0.234  (0.375) 
Middle East/North Africa  0.022  (0.718)  -0.390  (0.677) 
Central/Latin America  -0.247  (0.437)  -0.767*  (0.452) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.049 (0.204) -0.040 (0.198) 
United  States  -0.089 (0.341) -0.187 (0.332) 
Italy  -0.443*  (0.258) -0.556** (0.241) 
Constant  -1.903*  (1.118) -1.164 (1.035) 
R-squared _0.4579  0.4910 
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B. Czech Social Democratic 
Party (CSSD) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political Freedom  0.401  (0.329)  0.609*  (0.334) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  -0.042*  (0.022) -0.027 (0.026) 
Fraction Years Free  -1.519  (1.011)  -3.102***  (1.117) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  -1.519*  (0.911)  -2.960***  (1.007) 
EF: Size of Government  -0.046  (0.089)  -0.158*  (0.085) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.420**  (0.183)  0.213  (0.185) 
EF:  Sound  Money  0.208 (0.172) 0.178 (0.168) 
EF: Foreign Trade  0.007  (0.143)  -0.019  (0.141) 
EF:  Regulation  -0.451**  (0.198) -0.264 (0.201) 
GDP per capita  -0.066*  (0.038)  -0.058  (0.038) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  0.008 (0.048) 0.038 (0.047) 
Inflation  [%]  0.048**  (0.022) 0.032 (0.024) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  0.051 (0.256) 0.158 (0.245) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  -0.345 (0.301) 0.053 (0.286) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1 1.551*  (0.864)  2.092**  (0.808) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  -0.081 (0.635) 0.553 (0.599) 
Weak presidential
2  0.337 (0.568) 0.264 (0.552) 
Parliamentary
2  -0.282 (0.308) -0.234 (0.305) 
Central/Eastern Europe  -0.981  (0.643)  -1.750***  (0.643) 
Former  Soviet  Union  -1.556 (1.096) -0.663 (1.075) 
South  East  Asia  -0.795 (0.585) -0.261 (0.593) 
Middle East/North Africa  -2.892**  (1.124)  -1.178  (1.071) 
Central/Latin  America  0.001 (0.685) 0.596 (0.714) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.134 (0.319) -0.128 (0.312) 
United  States  0.844 (0.534) 0.755 (0.525) 
Italy  -1.186***  (0.404) -0.771** (0.382) 
Constant  -0.548 (1.750) -1.050 (1.636) 
R-squared 0.5823  0.5999 
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C. Communist Party of Bohemia 
and Moravia (KSCM) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  1.666**  (0.716) 0.173 (0.765) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  -0.124**  (0.048) 0.018 (0.061) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -3.903*  (2.201) -3.193 (2.561) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  -5.898***  (1.984)  -4.424*  (2.311) 
EF: Size of Government  0.159  (0.193)  0.020  (0.195) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.828**  (0.400)  0.710*  (0.424) 
EF:  Sound  Money  -0.387 (0.374) -0.292 (0.385) 
EF: Foreign Trade  0.686**  (0.313)  0.726**  (0.324) 
EF:  Regulation  -0.893**  (0.432) -0.737 (0.461) 
GDP  per  capita  -0.033 (0.084) -0.059 (0.088) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  -0.124 (0.105) -0.123 (0.107) 
Inflation  [%]  0.012 (0.048) 0.026 (0.055) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  0.195 (0.557) 0.445 (0.562) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  -0.206 (0.655) 0.102 (0.656) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  1.786 (1.882) 1.862 (1.853) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  1.347 (1.383) 1.584 (1.375) 
Weak presidential
2  1.380 (1.236) 1.281 (1.267) 
Parliamentary
2  -1.531** (0.671) -1.714** (0.700) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  -1.109 (1.401) -0.588 (1.476) 
Former  Soviet  Union  -3.109 (2.387) -1.097 (2.467) 
South  East  Asia  -1.103 (1.275) -0.046 (1.360) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  0.113 (2.448) 0.699 (2.457) 
Central/Latin  America  -0.824 (1.491) 0.075 (1.639) 
Anglo-Saxon  0.291 (0.695) 0.302 (0.717) 
United  States  0.122 (1.162) 0.033 (1.204) 
Italy -2.356***  (0.879)  -1.684*  (0.875) 
Constant  -7.202* (3.813) -6.681* (3.754) 
R-squared 0.6192  05954 
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D. Coalition (KDU-US)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  -0.076 (0.243) -0.300 (0.244) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  0.008 (0.016) 0.014 (0.019) 
Fraction Years Free  0.783  (0.747)  1.756**  (0.817) 
Fraction  Years  Partially  Free  0.371 (0.673) 1.200 (0.737) 
EF: Size of Government  -0.095  (0.066)  -0.060  (0.062) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  -0.440***  (0.136)  -0.378***  (0.135) 
EF:  Sound  Money  -0.109 (0.127) -0.075 (0.123) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  -0.082 (0.106) -0.038 (0.103) 
EF:  Regulation  0.603*** (0.146) 0.528*** (0.147) 
GDP per capita  0.086***  (0.028)  0.075***  (0.028) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  0.015 (0.036) 0.003 (0.034) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.008 (0.016) 0.002 (0.018) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  0.071 (0.189) 0.068 (0.179) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  0.332 (0.222) 0.209 (0.209) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  0.884 (0.638) 0.724 (0.591) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  0.439 (0.469) 0.220 (0.438) 
Weak presidential
2  0.570 (0.419) 0.537 (0.404) 
Parliamentary
2  0.582** (0.227) 0.513** (0.223) 
Central/Eastern Europe  0.481  (0.475)  0.947**  (0.470) 
Former  Soviet  Union  -0.134 (0.810) -0.354 (0.786) 
South  East  Asia  -0.396 (0.433) -0.532 (0.433) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  -0.155 (0.830) -0.847 (0.783) 
Central/Latin  America  0.351 (0.506) 0.141 (0.522) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.158 (0.236) -0.141 (0.228) 
United  States  0.013 (0.394) 0.048 (0.384) 
Italy  1.522*** (0.298) 1.415*** (0.279) 
Constant -2.087  (1.293)  -1.995*  (1.197) 
R-squared 0.8007  0.8130 
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E. Others  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  0.749**  (0.301) -0.207 (0.323) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  -0.036*  (0.020) 0.032 (0.026) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -2.832***  (0.926) -2.165** (1.082) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  -1.227  (0.835)  0.335  (0.976) 
EF: Size of Government  0.079  (0.081)  0.089  (0.082) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.153  (0.168)  0.308*  (0.179) 
EF:  Sound  Money  -0.374** (0.157) -0.351** (0.162) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  -0.116 (0.132) -0.181 (0.137) 
EF:  Regulation  0.354* (0.182) 0.329* (0.195) 
GDP  per  capita  0.024 (0.035) 0.024 (0.037) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  0.004 (0.044) -0.020 (0.045) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.085*** (0.020) -0.071*** (0.023) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  -0.804*** (0.234) -0.818*** (0.238) 
Gov.: Left wing
1 -0.282  (0.276)  -0.487*  (0.277) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1 -2.000**  (0.792)  -2.563***  (0.783) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  -0.122 (0.582) -0.561 (0.581) 
Weak presidential
2  -0.699 (0.520) -0.493 (0.535) 
Parliamentary
2  -0.124 (0.282) -0.146 (0.296) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  -0.963 (0.589) -0.478 (0.623) 
Former  Soviet  Union  1.098 (1.005) 1.614 (1.042) 
South East Asia  0.754  (0.537)  0.971*  (0.574) 
Middle East/North Africa  3.743***  (1.030)  2.892***  (1.038) 
Central/Latin  America  0.085 (0.627) 0.316 (0.692) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.411 (0.292) -0.480 (0.303) 
United  States  -1.011** (0.489) -0.997** (0.509) 
Italy  -0.068 (0.370) -0.050 (0.370) 
Constant  -2.884*  (1.604) -1.714 (1.586) 
R-squared 05774  0.5473 
 
Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
χ
2(10) = 42.58***  χ
2(10) = 41.67*** 
Notes: Number of observations is 54. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) model and applying the General-to-Specific procedure. Analytic weights are 
applied using the total number of votes per country. Omitted variables include: fraction of years not free, 
right-wing government, strong presidential system and Western Europe. A dummy for Italy is added 
because votes from Italy also include those from the Vatican. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 
5% (**) and 10% (*). The Breusch-Pagan test of independence indicates that we can reject the null 
hypothesis of independence of the residuals across the equations in each of the Polish and Czech 
regressions. Therefore, OLS estimates would be inconsistent and the choice of SUR is justified. 
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Table A2 Poland: General Unrestricted Model Specification 
A. Coalition of Democratic Left 
and Union of Labor (SLD-UP) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  0.376*  (0.192) 0.076 (0.172) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  -0.027**  (0.012) -0.006 (0.014) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -0.582 (0.637) 0.120 (0.737) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  -0.899*  (0.494)  -0.391  (0.559) 
EF: Size of Government  -0.003  (0.043)  -0.011  (0.044) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  -0.091  (0.072)  -0.133*  (0.070) 
EF:  Sound  Money  -0.037 (0.064) -0.021 (0.066) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  0.073 (0.081) 0.121 (0.080) 
EF:  Regulation  -0.266*** (0.088) -0.272*** (0.093) 
GDP per capita  0.005  (0.015)  -0.001  (0.015) 
Gini  Index  0.013 (0.009) 0.015 (0.010) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  0.006 (0.028) -0.004 (0.030) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.005 (0.009) -0.009 (0.010) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  0.273**  (0.114) 0.306*** (0.115) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  -0.058 (0.121) -0.013 (0.121) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  0.309 (0.406) 0.410 (0.414) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  0.875*** (0.308) 0.815*** (0.304) 
Weak presidential
2  0.140 (0.388) 0.107 (0.392) 
Parliamentary
2  0.298**  (0.152) 0.263 (0.167) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  -0.267 (0.384) 0.119 (0.424) 
Former  Soviet  Union  -0.505 (0.499) -0.179 (0.516) 
South  East  Asia  0.197 (0.316) 0.228 (0.326) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  0.362 (0.438) 0.363 (0.452) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -0.403 (0.423) -0.370 (0.446) 
Central/Latin  America  -0.380 (0.347) -0.419 (0.359) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.258 (0.162) -0.241 (0.164) 
United  States  0.230 (0.221) 0.192 (0.230) 
Italy  -1.515*** (0.187) -1.483*** (0.196) 
Constant  -0.164 (0.970) 0.245 (0.954) 
R-squared 0.8912  0.8830 
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B. Solidarity Electoral Action 
(AWSP) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  -0.356 (0.410) -0.254 (0.360) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  0.012 (0.026) 0.025 (0.029) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -0.176 (1.360) -0.748 (1.540) 
Fraction  Years  Partially  Free  -0.264 (1.055) -0.200 (1.168) 
EF: Size of Government  0.001  (0.093)  -0.040  (0.092) 
EF:  Legal/Property  Rights  -0.152 (0.153) -0.215 (0.147) 
EF:  Sound  Money  -0.104 (0.137) -0.076 (0.137) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  0.075 (0.173) 0.121 (0.168) 
EF:  Regulation  0.353*  (0.188) 0.246 (0.195) 
GDP per capita  0.074**  (0.031)  0.063**  (0.032) 
Gini  Index  0.026 (0.020) 0.029 (0.020) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  -0.283*** (0.059) -0.252*** (0.062) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.030 (0.020) -0.019 (0.021) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  -0.217 (0.244) 0.016 (0.239) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  -0.245 (0.257) -0.049 (0.252) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  -0.968 (0.867) -0.501 (0.865) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  -0.672 (0.658) -0.240 (0.635) 
Weak presidential
2  0.370 (0.828) -0.003 (0.819) 
Parliamentary
2  0.519 (0.325) 0.316 (0.349) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  0.948 (0.820) 0.430 (0.885) 
Former  Soviet  Union  2.470** (1.065) 2.153** (1.078) 
South  East  Asia  -0.371 (0.674) -0.142 (0.681) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  0.840 (0.935) 0.995 (0.944) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.327 (0.903) -0.101 (0.931) 
Central/Latin  America  0.606 (0.741) 0.413 (0.750) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.235 (0.346) -0.009 (0.343) 
United  States  -0.721 (0.473) -0.748 (0.479) 
Italy  1.518*** (0.398) 1.599*** (0.409) 
Constant -2.791  (2.069)  -3.507*  (1.993) 
R-squared 0.6616  0.6052 
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C. Union of Freedom (UW)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  -0.214 (0.253) 0.138 (0.218) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  0.012 (0.016) -0.015 (0.018) 
Fraction  Years  Free  0.452 (0.838) 0.020 (0.935) 
Fraction  Years  Partially  Free  0.885 (0.650) 0.328 (0.709) 
EF: Size of Government  -0.040  (0.057)  -0.050  (0.056) 
EF:  Legal/Property  Rights  0.071 (0.094) 0.035 (0.089) 
EF:  Sound  Money  0.112 (0.084) 0.118 (0.083) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  -0.077 (0.107) -0.069 (0.102) 
EF:  Regulation  0.231** (0.116) 0.251** (0.119) 
GDP  per  capita  0.024 (0.019) 0.028 (0.019) 
Gini  Index  0.018 (0.012) 0.019 (0.012) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  0.035 (0.036) 0.031 (0.038) 
Inflation  [%]  0.009 (0.012) 0.007 (0.013) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  0.472*** (0.151) 0.454*** (0.145) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  0.274* (0.159) 0.265* (0.153) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  0.740 (0.535) 0.779 (0.525) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1 0.539  (0.405)  0.716*  (0.385) 
Weak presidential
2  0.019 (0.510) -0.012 (0.497) 
Parliamentary
2  -0.381*  (0.200) -0.303 (0.212) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  0.649 (0.506) 0.441 (0.537) 
Former  Soviet  Union  0.268 (0.656) 0.045 (0.654) 
South  East  Asia  0.660 (0.415) 0.638 (0.413) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  -0.142 (0.577) -0.058 (0.573) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.436 (0.556) 0.409 (0.565) 
Central/Latin  America  0.063 (0.457) -0.012 (0.455) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.594*** (0.213) -0.593*** (0.208) 
United  States  -1.428*** (0.291) -1.397*** (0.291) 
Italy  -0.120 (0.246) -0.152 (0.248) 
Constant  -4.944*** (1.276) -5.476*** (1.210) 
R-squared 0.8232  0.8234 
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D. Law and Justice (PiS)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  -0.455 (0.278) -0.227 (0.242) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  0.029*  (0.017) 0.023 (0.020) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -0.227 (0.921) -1.133 (1.038) 
Fraction  Years  Partially  Free  0.623 (0.714) 0.274 (0.787) 
EF: Size of Government  0.076  (0.063)  0.074  (0.062) 
EF:  Legal/Property  Rights  0.049 (0.104) 0.093 (0.099) 
EF:  Sound  Money  0.030 (0.093) 0.016 (0.092) 
EF: Foreign Trade  0.210*  (0.117)  0.164  (0.113) 
EF:  Regulation  -0.127 (0.127) -0.165 (0.132) 
GDP  per  capita  0.022 (0.021) 0.024 (0.022) 
Gini  Index  0.022 (0.013) 0.020 (0.013) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  -0.085**  (0.040) -0.061 (0.042) 
Inflation  [%]  0.001 (0.014) 0.010 (0.014) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  -0.296*  (0.165) -0.241 (0.161) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  -0.359** (0.174) -0.335** (0.170) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  -0.703 (0.587) -0.662 (0.583) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  -1.444*** (0.445) -1.294*** (0.427) 
Weak presidential
2  -0.128 (0.560) -0.206 (0.552) 
Parliamentary
2  -0.431** (0.220) -0.500** (0.235) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  0.103 (0.555) -0.478 (0.596) 
Former  Soviet  Union  0.048 (0.721) -0.369 (0.726) 
South East Asia  -0.801*  (0.456)  -0.747  (0.459) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  -0.770 (0.633) -0.755 (0.636) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.452**  (0.611)  -1.647***  (0.627) 
Central/Latin  America  -1.552*** (0.502) -1.546*** (0.505) 
Anglo-Saxon  0.099 (0.234) 0.162 (0.231) 
United  States  -0.454 (0.320) -0.437 (0.323) 
Italy  0.061 (0.270) 0.073 (0.276) 
Constant -1.978  (1.401)  -2.427*  (1.342) 
R-squared 0.7652  0.7607 
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E. Citizens’ Platform (PO)  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  0.130  (0.240) -0.419** (0.201) 
Civil/Political Freedom Squared  -0.009  (0.015)  0.034**  (0.016) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -1.482*  (0.796) -0.400 (0.862) 
Fraction Years Partially Free  -0.831  (0.617)  0.300  (0.653) 
EF: Size of Government  -0.076  (0.054)  -0.062  (0.052) 
EF:  Legal/Property  Rights  0.089 (0.090) 0.134 (0.082) 
EF:  Sound  Money  0.079 (0.080) 0.087 (0.077) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  -0.027 (0.102) -0.020 (0.094) 
EF:  Regulation  0.195*  (0.110) 0.123 (0.109) 
GDP  per  capita  -0.009 (0.018) -0.022 (0.018) 
Gini  Index  -0.007 (0.012) -0.008 (0.011) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  0.072**  (0.035) 0.092*** (0.035) 
Inflation  [%]  0.024**  (0.012) 0.031*** (0.012) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  0.508*** (0.143) 0.571*** (0.134) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  0.563*** (0.151) 0.586*** (0.141) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  -0.419 (0.508) -0.486 (0.484) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  0.535 (0.385) 0.291 (0.355) 
Weak presidential
2  0.647 (0.484) 0.601 (0.459) 
Parliamentary
2 -0.169  (0.190)  -0.323*  (0.195) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  -0.653 (0.480) -0.171 (0.495) 
Former Soviet Union  -1.447**  (0.623)  -1.005*  (0.603) 
South East Asia  -0.658*  (0.394)  -0.564  (0.381) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  -0.763 (0.547) -0.867 (0.529) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -0.206 (0.528) -0.133 (0.521) 
Central/Latin  America  0.307 (0.434) 0.437 (0.420) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.058 (0.202) -0.032 (0.192) 
United  States  -0.207 (0.277) -0.236 (0.268) 
Italy  0.215 (0.233) 0.238 (0.229) 
Constant  -2.818** (1.211) -2.432** (1.115) 
R-squared 0.6034  0.6266 
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F. League of Polish Families 
(LPR) 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  -0.664 (0.518) -0.349 (0.452) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  0.036 (0.033) 0.025 (0.037) 
Fraction  Years  Free  3.534**  (1.717) 3.030 (1.935) 
Fraction  Years  Partially  Free  1.587 (1.332) 1.399 (1.467) 
EF: Size of Government  0.064  (0.117)  0.049  (0.116) 
EF:  Legal/Property  Rights  -0.145 (0.193) -0.154 (0.185) 
EF: Sound Money  -0.284*  (0.173)  -0.268  (0.172) 
EF:  Foreign  Trade  0.078 (0.219) 0.080 (0.211) 
EF: Regulation  0.406*  0.237)  0.327  (0.245) 
GDP  per  capita  0.006 (0.039) 0.000 (0.040) 
Gini  Index  -0.011 (0.025) -0.009 (0.025) 
GDP Growth [%]  -0.173**  (0.075)  -0.139*  (0.078) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.038 (0.025) -0.027 (0.027) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  -1.587*** (0.309) -1.474*** (0.301) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  -0.453 (0.325) -0.388 (0.317) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  -0.846 (1.095) -0.707 (1.087) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  -3.018*** (0.830) -2.723*** (0.797) 
Weak presidential
2  1.114 (1.045) 0.878 (1.030) 
Parliamentary
2 0.880**  (0.410)  0.790*  (0.439) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  1.600 (1.036) 1.169 (1.112) 
Former  Soviet  Union  4.309*** (1.345) 3.966*** (1.354) 
South East Asia  -1.535*  (0.851)  -1.401  (0.855) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  0.333 (1.181) 0.437 (1.187) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -1.007 (1.140) -1.210 (1.169) 
Central/Latin  America  -0.267 (0.935) -0.322 (0.943) 
Anglo-Saxon  0.087 (0.437) 0.204 (0.432) 
United  States  0.826 (0.597) 0.863 (0.602) 
Italy  -0.280 (0.503) -0.294 (0.514) 
Constant  -1.436 (2.613) -2.535 (2.504) 
R-squared 0.8070  0.8033 
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G. Others  Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
Civil/Political  Freedom  0.488 (0.382) -0.018 (0.344) 
Civil/Political  Freedom  Squared  -0.046*  (0.024) 0.014 (0.028) 
Fraction  Years  Free  -0.103 (1.266) 0.002 (1.473) 
Fraction  Years  Partially  Free  -1.283 (0.982) -0.425 (1.117) 
EF: Size of Government  0.138  (0.086)  0.074  (0.088) 
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.356**  (0.143)  0.221  (0.141) 
EF: Sound Money  -0.332***  (0.127)  -0.287**  (0.131) 
EF: Foreign Trade  -0.031  (0.162)  0.091  (0.160) 
EF:  Regulation  0.088 (0.175) -0.028 (0.187) 
GDP per capita  -0.066**  (0.029)  -0.085***  (0.031) 
Gini  Index  -0.052***  (0.018) -0.046** (0.019) 
GDP  Growth  [%]  0.008 (0.055) 0.018 (0.059) 
Inflation  [%]  -0.024 (0.019) -0.019 (0.020) 
Gov.: Centrist or mixed
1  -0.795***  (0.227) -0.449** (0.229) 
Gov.: Left wing
1  -0.259 (0.240) 0.083 (0.241) 
Gov.: authoritarian
1  -0.569 (0.808) 0.250 (0.827) 
Gov.: ethnic/religious
1  -0.495 (0.612) -0.099 (0.607) 
Weak presidential
2  0.800 (0.771) 0.351 (0.784) 
Parliamentary
2  0.393 (0.303) 0.063 (0.334) 
Central/Eastern  Europe  -0.759 (0.764) -0.911 (0.847) 
Former  Soviet  Union  -0.657 (0.991) -0.558 (1.031) 
South East Asia  -1.443**  (0.627)  -1.135*  (0.651) 
Middle  East/North  Africa  0.263 (0.871) 0.418 (0.903) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  1.013 (0.841) 0.451 (0.890) 
Central/Latin  America  1.231*  (0.690) 0.902 (0.718) 
Anglo-Saxon  -0.729**  (0.322) -0.419 (0.329) 
United  States  1.658*** (0.440) 1.521*** (0.459) 
Italy  0.067 (0.371) 0.279 (0.391) 
Constant  -1.571 (1.927) -1.131 (1.906) 
R-squared 0.5326  0.4921 
 
Breusch-Pagan Test of Independence 
Civil Liberties  Political Rights 
χ
2(21) =85.20***  χ
2(21) = 86.66*** 
Notes: Number of observations is 66. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) model and applying the General-to-Specific procedure. Analytic weights are 
applied using the total number of votes per country. Omitted variables include: fraction of years not free, 
right-wing government, strong presidential system and Western Europe. A dummy for Italy is added 
because votes from Italy also include those from the Vatican. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 
5% (**) and 10% (*). The Breusch-Pagan test of independence indicates that we can reject the null 
hypothesis of independence of the residuals across the equations in each of the Polish and Czech 
regressions. Therefore, OLS estimates would be inconsistent and the choice of SUR is justified. 
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Appendix B: List of Explanatory Variables: 
 
Measures of Democracy 
•  Freedom House Democracy Index: The average of 2001 indicators of political freedom and civil 
liberties as reported by Freedom House, rescaled so that it ranges from 0 (no democracy) to 10 
(full democracy).  
•  Sub-Indexes of Freedom House Democracy 
-  Civil Liberties 
-  Political Rights 
•  Duration of Democracy: Fraction of years between 1972 and 2001 in which the country is 
considered free, partially free, and not free, as reported by Freedom House. 
•  Democracy Dummies: Dummies included to measure whether the country is free, not free or 
partially free, where free is the omitted category, as reported by Freedom House. 
•  Polity Democracy Index: Computed by subtracting AUTOC (general closedness of political 
institutions) from DEMOC (general openness of political institutions), so that the resulting 
variable ranges from –10 (high autocracy) to 10 (high democracy), as reported by Polity IV 
Project Dataset. 
 
Measures of Political Environment 
•  Political orientation of the current government: Coded as 1. Right-wing, 2. Centrist/mixed, 3. 
Left-wing, 4. Authoritarian and 5. Ethnic/Religious, right wing is omitted category. As reported in 
Beck, George, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001)’s Database of Political Institutions and updated by 
the authors using information reported on http://www.electionworld.org/index.html.  
•  Political System: Coded as 1. Direct Presidential, 2. Weak Presidential (relatively strong president 
elected by the legislature) and 3. Parliamentary, where direst presidential is the omitted category. 
As reported in Beck, George, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001)’s Database of Political Institutions 
and updated by the authors using information reported on www.electionworld.org/index.html.  
 
Measures of Economic Freedom 
•  Heritage Economic Freedom Index: The 2001 economic freedom index as reported by the 
Heritage Foundation, rescaled so that it ranges between 0 (not free) and 5 (most free).  
•  Fraser Economic Freedom Index: The 2000 economic freedom index as reported by the Fraser 
Institute, which ranges between 0 (not free) and 10 (most free). 
•  Sub-indexes of Fraser Economic Freedom: 
Each of the following indexes are measured on a 10 point scale determining the extent to which 
each area is considered economically free, ranging from 0 (not free) to 10(most free): 
-  Size of Government: Expenditure, Taxes and Enterprise 
-  Legal Structure and Security of Property Right 
-  Access to Sound Money 
-  Freedom to exchange with foreigners 
-  Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business 
 
Measures of Economic Development 
•  GDP per capita: Gross Domestic Product is in per capita terms at purchasing power parity and in 
thousands of current US$ as of 2000, as reported by the World Development Indicators.  
•  GDP Growth: Gross Domestic Product growth is in percent as of 2000, as reported by the World 
Development Indicators.  
•  Inflation: Inflation is the GDP deflator (annual %) in percent, as of 2000, as reported by the 
World Development Indicators.   
•  Gini Coefficient: The gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality, taken from Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) database and the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) 
in various years. 
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Distance Measures 
•  Distance: Measures the distance from host country capital to home country capital, measured in 
kilometers by City Distance Tool www.geobytes.com/CityDistancetool.htm. 
•  Border Dummies: Dummies included for countries which share a border with the Czech Republic 
and Poland. 
 
Additional Dummies Included 
•  Regional dummies: Included for Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Former Soviet 
Union, South East Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Sahara Africa, Central and Latin 
America and Anglo-Saxon Countries, where Western Europe is the omitted category. 
•  Italy Dummy: Included as votes from Italy also include those from the Vatican.  
 
 Table B1: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables: Political Indicators 
 
Sub-Indexes of Freedom House
Democracy Index 2000
1 
Sub-Indexes of Freedom House 
Democracy Index 2001
1 




































Former Soviet Union  3.90  3.83 3.67  3.70  3.67 3.50 0  0.32  0.30  0.10  3.30  0.20 
  (1.79) (1.37)  (2.46)  (1.77) (1.31)  (2.41)  (0)  0.15  (6.75)  (6.92)  (1.16) (0.63) 
Central and Eastern Europe  7.86  7.38 8.45  7.93  7.50 8.57  0.25 0.22  8.23  8.62  2.43  1.64 
  (1.83) (1.56)  (2.31)  (1.69) (1.42)  (2.25)  (0.16)  0.22  (1.74)  (1.33)  (0.94) (0.74) 
Asia  5.36  5.00 5.48  5.36  5.00 5.48  0.24 0.45  3.00  3.07  3.36  1.14 
  (3.34) (2.77)  (3.89)  (3.34) (2.77)  (3.89)  (0.31)  0.38  (7.45)  (7.36)  (1.50) (0.86) 
North Africa and Middle-East  2.47  2.44 2.11  2.13  2.11 1.89  0.02 0.44  -4.00  -4.08  3.67  0.33 
  (1.68) (1.77)  (1.83)  (1.46) (1.47)  (1.65)  (0.06)  0.33  (4.80)  (4.79)  (0.98) (0.72) 
Sub-Sahara Africa  4.58  4.31 4.45  4.58  4.17 4.72  0.05 0.48  2.36  3.18  3.08  0.33 
  (2.50) (1.94)  (3.28)  (2.43) (2.07)  (3.00)  (0.10)  0.30  (4.88)  (5.12)  (1.16) (0.78) 
Central and South America  7.08  6.67 7.50  7.17  6.67 7.64  0.46 0.37  7.08  7.08  1.83  0.08 
  (2.71) (2.75)  (2.89)  (2.79) (2.84)  (2.97)  (0.29)  0.28  (4.58)  (4.58)  (0.83) (0.29) 
Anglo-Saxon  9.83  9.72 10  9.83  9.72 10 1  0  10  10  1.50  1.67 
  (0.41) (0.68)  (0) (0.41) (0.68)  (0) (0)  0  (0)  (0)  (0.84)  (0.82) 
Western Europe  9.50  9.17 10  9.50  9.17 10  0.97  0.02  9.94  9.94  1.61  1.72 
  (0.71) (1.18)  (0) (0.71) (1.18)  (0)  (0.07) 0.05  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.78)  (0.67) 
United States  10 10  10  10 10  10  1  0  10  10  1  0 
Notes:
  The table reports the mean values for each explanatory variable, with the standard deviation in parentheses.  
1 The democracy index is the average of 2000 and 2001 indicators of political freedoms and civil liberties as reported by the Freedom House, rescaled so that it ranges 
from 0 (no democracy) to 10 (full democracy). 
2 Fraction years free (partially free) is a variable that corresponds to the fraction of the years that the country was 
classified as free (partially free) by the Freedom House. 
3The Polity democracy index for 2001 and 2002 ranges from –10 (high autocracy) to 10 (high democracy) 
4Political orientation of the government. 
5 Political system: presidential, weak presidential (relatively strong president elected by the legislature), parliamentary. 
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Table B2: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables: Economic and Inequality Indicators 
 
Sub-Indexes of Fraser Economic Freedom Index 2000
1 





































Former Soviet Union  5.50 5.19 5.81 4.53 6.78 5.20 1.35 1.31  4.23 38.84 5.96 35.49 
  (1.57) (1.29) (2.06) (4.35) (0.19) (1.27) (0.49) (0.49)  (2.25) (12.71) (3.14)  (55.03) 
Central and Eastern Europe  6.10 4.85 6.49 6.44 7.02 5.69 1.95 2.05  9.01 30.40 4.69  7.60 
  (0.70) (1.14) (0.74) (1.90) (0.93) (0.54) (0.62) (0.58)  (3.92) (4.12)  (1.75)  (10.81) 
Asia  6.80 6.80 5.73 8.03 7.28 6.17 2.06 2.07  9.78 37.50 5.91  3.30 
  (1.14) (1.35) (1.74) (1.51) (1.52) (1.03) (1.02) (1.02)  (9.71) (8.33)  (2.97)  (4.93) 
North Africa and Middle-East  6.05 5.61 6.11 7.46 5.95 4.96 1.58 1.60  6.94 43.24 3.68 15.13 
  (1.08) (1.26) (1.57) (1.90) (1.34) (1.32) (0.85) (0.89)  (4.88) (10.18) (2.19)  (15.92) 
Sub-Sahara Africa  5.52 5.99 4.42 5.92 6.32 5.25 1.50 1.65  2.01 45.32 2.49 50.23 
  (1.02) (1.04) (1.42) (2.19) (0.57) (1.07) (0.58) (0.39)  (2.42) (8.28)  (3.45) (119.97) 
Central and South America  6.66 7.31 5.09 7.63 7.00 6.25 2.11 2.12  7.73 49.27 3.46  7.72 
  (0.70) (0.93) (1.19) (1.55) (0.72) (0.61) (0.74) (0.73)  (2.22) (8.98)  (2.62)  (7.41) 
Anglo-Saxon  8.21 6.46 9.23 9.40 8.24 7.71 3.14 3.19  26.85  37.19 4.62  3.31 
  (0.21) (0.59) (0.18) (0.26) (0.43) (0.46) (0.10) (0.15)  (4.93) (4.53)  (3.51)  (1.08) 
Western Europe  7.38 4.60 8.43 9.28 8.01 6.57 2.73 2.78  25.67  31.78 4.05  3.02 
  (0.47) (1.24) (1.03) (0.65) (0.74) (0.68) (0.26) (0.27)  (7.28) (4.31)  (1.52)  (3.54) 
United States  8.54 7.57 9.23 9.66  8  8.23  3.2 3.25  34.14  40.8  4.2  2.21 
Notes:
  The table reports the mean values for each explanatory variable, with the standard deviation in parentheses.  
1 The Fraser Economic Freedom Index and sub-indexes are measured on a 10 point scale determining the extent to which each area is considered economically 
free, ranging from 0 (not free) to 10(most free).
 2 The Heritage economic freedom index is the 2002 value of the index, rescaled so that it ranges between 0 (not 
free) and 5 (most free). 
3 Gross national income is in per capita terms and in thousands current US$. 
4 The gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality, 
which ranges from 0 (perfect equality) and 100 (perfect inequality). 
5 GDP growth is in percent. 
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Appendix C: List of Regions and Countries 
Former Soviet Union    Central and Eastern Europe    Western Europe    Middle East and North Africa 
Polish Votes  Czech Votes    Polish Votes Czech Votes    Polish Votes  Czech Votes    Polish Votes  Czech Votes 
Azerbaijan Belarus    Albania  Albania   Austria  Austria    Algeria  Algeria 
Belarus Georgia    Bosnia-All  Bosnia-All    Belgium  Belgium    Egypt  Egypt 
Jordan Kazakhstan    Bulgaria  Bulgaria    Cyprus  Cyprus    Iran  Iran 
Kazakhstan Russia    Croatia Croatia   Denmark  Denmark    Iraq  Iraq 
Moldova Ukraine    Czech  Estonia    Finland  Finland    Jordan  Kuwait 
Russia Uzbekistan    Estonia  Hungary    France France   Kuwait  Lebanon 
Ukraine    Hungary  Latvia    Germany  Germany    Lebanon  Libya 
Uzbekistan     Latvia  Lithuania   Greece  Greece    Libya  Morocco 
     Lithuania  Poland    Iceland  Israel    Morocco  Saudi  Arabia 
Asia   Macedonia  Romania    Israel  Italy    Saudi  Arabia  Syria 
Polish Votes  Czech Votes    Romania Slovakia    Italy  Netherlands    Syria  Tunisia 
China China    Slovakia  Slovenia    Luxembourg  Norway   Tunisia Turkey 
Hong  Kong  India   Slovenia      Netherlands  Portugal   Turkey  United  Arab  Emir. 
India Indonesia          Norway  Spain   United Arab Emir. Yemen 
Indonesia Japan          Portugal  Sweden    Yemen  
Japan Korea  South    Latin America   Spain  Switzerland       
Korea North  Malaysia    Polish Votes Czech Votes    Sweden     Sub-Sahara Africa 
Korea South  Mongolia    Argentina Argentina    Switzerland     Polish Votes  Czech Votes 
Malaysia Pakistan    Brazil  Brazil          Angola  Congo-Kinshasa 
Singapore Philippines    Chile  Chile    Anglo-Saxon   Congo-Kinshasa  Cote  d'Ivoire 
Taiwan Singapore   Columbia  Columbia    Polish Votes  Czech Votes   Kenya Ethiopia 
Thailand   Thailand    Costa Rica  Costa Rica    Australia  Australia    Madagascar  Ghana 
 Vietnam    Cuba Cuba    Canada  Canada    Nigeria  Kenya 
     Mexico  Mexico    Ireland  Ireland    Senegal  Nigeria 
     Panama  Peru    USA  USA    South  Africa  South  Africa 
      Peru  Uruguay    United Kingdom United Kingdom   Tanzania  Zimbabwe 
     Uruguay  Venezuela        Zimbabwe   
     Venezuela               58
Table C1 Bivariate Correlations of Fraser Economic Freedom Index and Sub-Indexes 
 
2000 Fraser Index  Economic Freedom  EF: Size of Government EF: Legal/Property Rights  EF: Sound Money  EF: Foreign Trade  EF: Regulation 
Economic Freedom   1           
EF: Size of Government  0.22 1       
EF: Legal/Property Rights  0.76 -0.32  1       
EF: Sound Money  0.84 0.03  0.60  1     
EF: Foreign Trade  0.76 0.01  0.57  0.51  1   
EF: Regulation  0.85 0.20  0.63  0.56  0.66  1 
 2008
B01-08 Euro-Diplomatie durch gemeinsame „Wirtschaftsregierung“ Martin Seidel
2007
B03-07 Löhne und Steuern im Systemwettbewerb der Mitgliedstaaten
der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B02-07 Konsolidierung und Reform der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B01-07 The Ratiﬁcation of European Treaties - Legal and Constitutio-
nal Basis of a European Referendum.
Martin Seidel
2006
B03-06 Financial Frictions, Capital Reallocation, and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations
Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B02-06 Financial Openness and Macroeconomic Volatility Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B01-06 A Welfare Analysis of Capital Account Liberalization Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
2005
B11-05 Das Kompetenz- und Entscheidungssystem des Vertrages von
Rom im Wandel seiner Funktion und Verfassung
Martin Seidel
B10-05 Die Schutzklauseln der Beitrittsverträge Martin Seidel
B09-05 Measuring Tax Burdens in Europe Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B08-05 Remittances as Investment in the Absence of Altruism Gabriel González-König
B07-05 Economic Integration in a Multicone World? Christian Volpe Martincus, Jenni-
fer Pédussel Wu
B06-05 Banking Sector (Under?)Development in Central and Eastern
Europe
Jürgen von Hagen, Valeriya Din-
ger
B05-05 Regulatory Standards Can Lead to Predation Stefan Lutz
B04-05 Währungspolitik als Sozialpolitik Martin Seidel
B03-05 Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate
and Teaching to Stay?
Panu Poutvaara
B02-05 Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis of Migrant Voting Behavior Jan Fidrmuc, Orla Doyle
B01-05 Macroeconomic Adjustment in the New EU Member States Jürgen von Hagen, Iulia Traistaru
2004
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